NEW TIMES

March 1992

Will the Basques disrupt the Summer Olympic Games?

11

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

The forbidden fruit

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Directorate Five of the KGB used to give its female agents flowers on International Women's Day

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NEW TIMES

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The best way to beat an old enemy is to join him

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Russian women understand emancipation as the right not to work

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Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, RUSSIA, Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67

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Editor-in-Chief
Alexander PUMPYANSKY

Associate editors:
Lev BEZYMENSKY
Vitaly GANYUSHKIN
Sergei GOLYAKOV
Vitaly IGNATENKO
Leonid MLECHIN
Pavel SAMARCHYAN
Marina SHAKINA
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Editor-in-Chief of English edition
Victor KAMOTSKY

Sergei DUBOV,
President of the joint-stock company
New Times Publishing House

We have correspondents in
Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Delhi, London, Mexico, New York, Prague, Pretoria, Rome, Seoul, Sofia, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw

Founders:
***New Times* journalists**

Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, Russia
Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67
Telex: 411164a newt SU, 411164b newt SU
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From our mailbag

■ I was prompted to write to you by Dmitry Muretov's essay "Eros, the people and politics" (No. 51/91).

Relations between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples (I stress: between peoples, not ruling circles) have always been friendly. However, interethnic conflicts existed and still exist. Ukraine joined Russia on the principles of autonomy, as is pointed out in the treaty of 1654. Under this treaty Ukraine preserved its government, army and the liberties enjoyed by the Cossacks.

The Tsarist government of Russia, naturally, did not want even to think about Ukraine's autonomy. Gradually, it began to violate points of the 1654 treaty and then completely forgot about it. In an attempt to kill the feeling of statehood in the Ukrainians, tsarism began to force national self-consciousness out of their minds. The Ukrainians were forbidden to use their native tongue in schools, government offices and churches.

There is an opinion in Russia that the Ukrainian nation does not exist, that the Ukrainians are the same as Russians and their language is merely a dialect. Even some Russian intellectuals think that Ukraine is an outlying district of Russia, Little Russia, and that the Ukrainian language is the same Russian language, only slightly spoiled. "Those who recognize the Ukrainians as a nation in its own right deny their belonging to the Russian nation," Dmitry Muretov writes in his essay.

The Ukrainians and Russians are two different nations, and not one Great Russian one. The Russians should not be referred to as the Great Russian nation. It does harm both to the Ukrainians and Russians. I do not deny that our cultures have much in common. However, each of them has its unique features. Ukrainian culture exists by itself. "The mother Ukraine now belongs to where great Novgorod is," Muretov writes. This is a manifestation of great-power thinking.

Many Russians regard Ukraine as something they own. But you, gentlemen, must understand that we, Ukrainians, are a nation, the same as the Russian nation.

V. Borisenko
Sumy Region, Ukraine

■ The communist conspirators who attempted to seize state power last August will soon be tried. I watch the investigation as if it were a strange play. Imagine the following situation: a bandit had been killing and plundering people all his life without being caught until the day when he reached into somebody's pocket to steal three rubles. Will he be tried only for this insignificant theft?

This is exactly the story of these plotters. Had they never committed crimes before the 18th of August? Did they become criminals only now, at the end of their lives? An investigative commission must be created in order to learn what crimes were committed by the

Shot, but not killed

■ Leonid Mlechin, the author of the article "Is it easy for women to kill?" (No. 47/91), appears in the role of a poisoner of wells by alleging that West Berlin student Benno Ohnesorg was killed by police. This statement reminds me of the campaign of instigation conducted for 40 years by East German Stalinists against the West Berlin police. Ohnesorg was shot by a criminal police employee who acted on his own and was in civilian clothes. The circumstances of the killing have not been clear till now. The policeman was sentenced to imprisonment, but not for killing. Our criminal code says: "A killer is a man who deprives another man of his life because of the thirst for killing, for satisfaction of his sexual desire, because of greed, with the help of means dangerous to society, or for concealing another crime." It is mean for your magazine to allege that the policeman concerned had these motives in mind. Such a statement does not measure up to the magazine's standard. Unlike the frontier troops of the communist German Democratic Republic, the West Berlin police were not a band of killers.

Herbert Woosc
police hauptmeister (retired)
Berlin, Germany

Photo from Der Spiegel (German)

With all my respect for the renowned West Berlin police and dislike of the former communist regime, shared by the hauptmeister, it has to be stated that student Benno Ohnesorg was nevertheless killed by a policeman during a protest demonstration against the Iranian shah's visit to West Berlin in 1967. This killing ignited student riots throughout West Germany and then led to the formation of left-radical terrorist groups which decided to reply to shooting by shooting.

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

arty nomenclature during the eriod of its rule, at least begin- ing with 1953, because we al- eady know about the crimes ommitted by Stalin. However, in ne post-Stalin period there has een a lot of criminal actions, for nstance, the internment of sane eople in lunatic asylums. What it to shoot someone? It is a hysical distruction of a human eing. The internment of a sane erson in a lunatic asylum is a piritual killing. Is this any less of- ensive? One is not tried for such rimes only because of the ab- ence in the Penal Code of the oncept of spiritual assassina- on. It is precisely these crimes nat must be investigated in- tead of hunting for flees. The unt for those who supported the utschists is a hunt for flees. The oup d'état is only the top of the eberg of crimes the party omenclature has committed! If nese crimes had been disclosed time, there would have been o putsch! In this case all the ost reactionary leaders of the omenclature would have been verthrown, and there would ave been no one to organize the utsch. But everyone was busy ith the revelations about Stalin och only. The coup was bound happen, because, in spite of *erestroika*, all criminals re- nained in their seats of power.

I am against a death sentence for the putschists. They are political cadavers and are no longer dangerous to society.

Veniamin Mochalov, aged 32
the Mari Republic

■ The farce staged by the putschists in Moscow on August 19 of last year was followed by a short play in India. On that day the Communist Party of India (Marxist) organized a ridiculous show which became an ideological parody. After the news of the coup came the CPI (Marxist) hastened to spread it in Delhi. Its members enthusiastically spoke about the venture of Yanayev and his company, calling the putsch a great, epochal victory for Marxism-Leninism. They denounced Gorbachev and Yeltsin as capitalist puppets.

The CPI (Marxist) was not in any way confused by the failure of the coup. It continues to sing the same old tune. In 1962, when Chinese troops invaded India, the CPI (Marxist) supported Beijing without the slightest hesitation. It did so in the name of communist internationalism.

Luckily, the conservative Stalinist faction of Indian Communists does not carry great weight in politics. The CPI (Marxist) is headed by a small group of Stalinist diehards, who have no backing among the youth. Incidentally, these obstinate dogmatists regularly underwent medical treatment in Moscow at the expense of the taxpayers. They wanted to prolong their lives for a further struggle in the name of a final victory of communism in the world.

Ved Prakash
New Delhi, India

I am a Russian living in Holland. My husband subscribed to *New Times* before our acquaintance. It can be regarded as a compliment to you. Of thousands of magazines, a foreigner chose *New Times* and subscribed to it.

In their letters many readers express discontent with your magazine. It is only natural. It would be unnatural if everyone were pleased with *New Times*. I particularly like Female Logic. The articles of Ivanova published under this rubric are clearly written. They contain no implications or conjectures.

Please, publish my letter. I want everyone to know that people abroad are interested in your magazine.

M. van der Geest
Venlo, Holland

"Our son of a bitch?"

Three false theses can be noted in the articles of nagazine, and the entire "democratic press," on rth Korean theme.

contend that our relations with North Korea were n an ideological basis, had a class character, and nerefore become meaningless today. If our relations im Il Sung were indeed ideologized in the past, this on disappeared after the conflict between Moscow ijing under Khrushchev. Then it became a marriage nvenience. The Democratic People's Republic of helped us to maintain a strategic balance in that im- t region.

use the words of President Roosevelt, Kim Il Sung **our son of a bitch."**

statements about Pyongyang's "aggressive de- are even more absurd. For what purpose would Sung invade South Korea? For raising the living rds of North Koreans? What would he do with the Korean population, which is twice bigger numeri- an the population of North Korea? And, most of all, hould he endanger the stability of his regime? The n of the country is much more advantage- because he can constantly maintain the enthusiasm of the deceived people. North Korea needs nuclear weapons not as a means of aggression, but as the only means of countering the insolent pressure of external forces.

Finally, the false thesis about Kim Il Sung as a Stalinist and dogmatist. I admire this man. The experiment conducted by him in North Korea today has universal importance, and no one has the right to interrupt it. Thanks to Kim Il Sung the Korean people, who could be compared with a heap of loose sand in the past, have turned into a monolith. They did not waver and withstood the pressure of superpowers. Kim Il Sung began with getting rid of Stalinists in the government and the party. Today he denounces our flirting with Seoul. He found common language with "Marxist" Pol Pot and "revisionist" Enrico Berlinguer (the late leader of the Italian Communist Party).

Kim Il Sung said recently: "We are now faced with the question of communism or nationalism. We see that communism is a secondary question. Who needs communism if there is no nation?" However, your "elite" magazine finds it more convenient to spread the time-worn stereotype of a narrow-minded dogmatist.

Russia also needs such a leader, and he will appear.

N. Yermakov

In their letters many readers express discontent with your magazine. It is only natural. It would be unnatural if everyone were pleased with *New Times*. I particularly like Female Logic. The articles of Ivanova published under this rubric are clearly written. They contain no implications or conjectures.

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M. van der Geest
Venlo, Holland

***Compiled by* T.Chernova**

ECONOMICS

Rubbery ruble

Alexei Kireyev,
Dr.Sc.(Econ.)

Is the Russian ruble's rising rate an initial indication of success for reformers or not?

Russia has always been conspicuous for many developments going against elementary logic. The current economic reform especially as concerns the monetary aspect is no exception. One would have thought the ten-fold price jump would have drained savings banks of resources to foot growing expenditure. On the contrary, the Russians deposited some 8.8 billion rubles, true, retaining 178.7 billion in cash at home.

The unpegged prices drastically increased inflation, which one would have thought should have induced the desire to exchange rubles for hard currency and thus guard against depreciation. But again Russians unexpectedly lined up not to purchase dollars but to sell them, startling, as I see it, even themselves, let alone the world.

Banks intervene

The government is optimistic. It claims that the soft ruble is strengthening thus betokening the start of healthier finances and successful reform. Russians, who by hook or by crook accumulated hard currency are in a quandary; enterprises exporting goods for hard currency are already toting up potential losses from the dollar's declining rate of exchange; foreigners generally are confused as dollar contracts are losing while soft-ruble contracts are gaining.

Whence the paradoxical rise in the ruble rate from the previous 240-260 per dollar down to 140-160 in clearing exchange, and from 110-140 per dollar down to 60-90 in cash exchange in the space of literally a few weeks?

These serious changes in the currency market are primarily due to the Russian Central Bank's purposeful policy of ruble stabilization. Though never officially explained, judging from what is taking place, it consists of three main planks, which are hard-currency intervention, the lowering of credit emission, and the scarcity of cash. Actually they add up to an explosive mixture of discount and devise policy which other countries always employ in one or another combination to prop up national currency rates of exchange. However, in themselves they are but palliatives unable to guarantee long-term stability.

Indeed, hard-currency intervention is the backbone of a policy whereby the Central Bank plays bulls and bears with foreign currency to either depreciate or, on the contrary, raise the ruble rate of exchange. Such intervention is customarily short-lived and is effected by means of the currency stabilization funds that most developed countries have and by short-term reciprocal crediting by national banks.

In our particular case such intervention is implemented by virtue of the stabilization fund, newly created via Yeltsin's decrees out of the mandatory sale of a tenth of netted hard curency gains to Russia's Central Bank by all enterprises in Russia without exception.

Meanwhile to artificially create currency exchange offers exceeding demands, it is sufficient each time to put up for sale relatively small sums of between two and three million from the stabilization fund. Yet, it is quite likely that the inexplicably lowered demand for hard currency after the rate of 60-70 rubles per dollar, will as unexpectedly give way to a sharply increased demand, and unexpectedly so as is often the case in Russia. What will the Central Bank do when it will be necessary to place dozens if not hundreds of millions of dollars up for sale? After all, the most optimistic forecasts put the hard-cur-

Fluctuation of the ruble's exchange rate in relation to the US dollar in 1992



The average exchange rate of the ruble in relation to the US dollar



1991 DOLLAR RATES

(Rough market rate in Moscow in rubles per US dollar)

Month	Buying	Selling
January	22	25
February	26	30
March	25	27
April	29	30
May	30	32
June	29	30
July	29	31
August	32	34
September	38	40
October	55	60
November	75	86
December	95	113

rency stabilization fund by the close of the year not be in excess of $200-300 million.

Even this amount might be lacking as this year enterprises have no export incentive, as they are subject to a far greater hard currency tax than last year, with 40 percent of the take, not profits as before, going to the Republican Hard-Currency Reserve and another 10 percent to the stabilization currency fund. Further foreign-owned enterprises and joint ventures wherein foreign partners control upwards of 30 percent, might decline to pay in 10 percent of the hard currency take, inasmuch as this proviso of the presidential decree conflicts with Article 35 of the earlier enacted Russian Law on Foreign Investment under which the entire hard currency take from the export of own produce remains at the disposal of the respective enterprise. If Russia seriously seeks to attract foreign investment, she should certainly not violate this newly enacted law.

Indeed, no other resources for hard currency intervention exist. As concerns the long-requested several billion dollar loan from the West for a ruble convertibility fund, it appears that this will not be forthcoming, until political stability dawns which will a long time in coming. Nor can IMF aid be expected as Russia is still not a full member. Then we cannot hope for any short-term credits from the national banks of other countries as our soft rubles do not attract. Hence it needs just one inadroit move for the peanuts hard-currency intervention, which is all the Russian Central Bank can manage, to bring about the ruble's complete collapse.

"Sorry, no more rubles available"

Lower crediting emission represents a variant of the policy employed to regulate the hard-currency market by changing the Central Bank rate. Excessive crediting emission, when banks credited clients with clearing rubles, always entailed a drop in the ruble rate, especially in clearing exchange. The Russian Central Bank faced two options in restricting such emission, either via harsher terms for centralized credit to commercial banks or by raising the bank rate,

The Central Bank employed both, forbidding resources to be used to finance middleman operations and raising the rate to 20 and more percent, which caused commercial banks jack up rates to 40-45 percent. In world practice this entails the influx of foreign short-term investment, a reduction in domestic credit and available cash, and the pegging of prices.

Don't forget that we are in Russia. Along with the unquestionably positive trend of less unbacked credit and cash, expensive credit has already resulted in nobody wanting or affording to invest in production, the development of natural resources and capital construction. With no bank crediting, enterprises are not investing. Development of production has been suspended. We are gobbling up what should by right belong to coming generations. Note that the depreciation of economy's basic assets stands at 50-70 percent. If crediting continues to orient on a rapid turnover based on the ruble-hard currency-commodity-ruble pattern under which all that can be really guaranteed are cans upon cans of beer plus chewing gum, industrial development will halt and the ruble will accordingly collapse.

Finally, there is one more way to maintain the ruble rate which is to create a shortage of cash. In world practice this is rare, as civilized countries churn out as much paper money as is needed for circulation. However, in Russia, where clearing accounts for the population are rudimentary, the price leap has brought about a shortage of cash. Whether this is artificially created or not is hard to fathom. The Russian

Russia will really open up only two years from now

Foreign investment should bolster the ruble. Without such investment we run the risk of destroying our entire technological, scientific and cultural potential. If attraction of foreign investment is successful, the ruble might outvie the dollar. But frankly speaking, Russia's present government, whom all are ready to accuse of selling the country down the river, is a far less "convenient" partner for foreign investment than the Pavlov administration.

Under a law enacted under the Pavlov administration foreign investors were granted the same rights as domestic entrepreneurs. But the present government in effect discriminates against foreign investors by restricting involvement in privatization. Further today all tax discounts joint ventures enjoyed have been abolished. Note that the world-wide demand for foreign investment is pretty high, and that there are far more peaceable places than Russia. The government is now preparing to introduce a special investment ruble rate for foreign capital, more specifically for involvement in privatization. Though this is not the previous totally unrealistic rate of one dollar to 1.80 rubles it is not one dollar to 110, 100 or even 70 rubles. Though it is hard to exactly say what the rate will amount to, one thinks it might be 10 rubles per dollar.

As I see it Russia will really open up to foreign investment not now, but only in a couple of years from now. At any rate foreign investment will already be taken for granted in some three years from now.

Leonid Valdman,
Cand.Sc.(Econ.), International Centre for Economic Reform Studies

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi poll

Western help not to be expected

What first and foremost could help all our people to survive the present troubles and lead a decent life?



- ○ The earliest implementation of economic reform
- △ Active entrepreneurship
- ◘ Pre-perestroika restoration
- ● Revival of pre-revolutionary Russia's national traditions
- ❁ All-round help from other countries
- ✻ Nothing will help

Thus far, fortunately enough, at any rate in Moscow, we still do not see so many people who would be absolutely desperate or be confirmed sceptics. Note that "Western aid" which at the outset engendered no a goodly degree of enthusiasm has drastically lost appeal in the eyes of the masses. Also note that virtually one out of seven hankers for the Brezhnev period, even for pre-revolutionary times, as a way out of the crisis.

Still, one out of every three if not more backs the reform policy, while nearly one out of every four has at last come to realize that tangible success depends upon the people's active involvement in social reform.

True, there are points that need to be mentioned. Thus when asked if they had personally tried in the process of economic reform to somehow demonstrate abilities and the desire and knack to do really hard work, 45 percent confessed that they had not lifted a finger.

Such are the results of a representative polling of 1,000 Moscovites conducted last January.

Central Bank, which alone in the CIS can engage in emission as all note-printing facilities and mints are in Russia, is either technically unable to print the needed amount of bank-notes or does not want to do so on the excuse that it doesn't have the technical means thereto.

The positive result is that no cash is available. People want to exchange the dollars, but they are told: "Sorry, no rubles on hand." This causes the Russian to feel jittery as he sees every shortage as sacrosanct and hence rushes to dump dollars and thus raise the rate of the "scarcity" ruble.

It is quite obvious that a shortage of cash, when hypertrophied – that is when employees do not get their pay and cash accounts and exchange operations are halted – will have ill-advised results. The government will scarcely be able to keep that up for long, as otherwise the country will find itself flooded with surrogate money in the form of regional, municipal and factory rubles or petro-aluminium, creosote if not even linen, notes let alone sundry coupons and cards. This will lead outright to a confiscational currency reform, inasmuch as the ruble will be snowed under by surrogate money.



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

To every taste

Still that the ruble rate has climbed is a fact. The government's invention for which the population has fallen produced unquestionably good results with several score millions of dollars flowing into the Treasury and the price halting or even falling somewhat as concerned a range of hard currency commodities.

However, one would err if one failed to realize that the rise in the ruble rate is artificial and consequently temporary. Tendencies resisting its strengthening are far more serious than those that engendered this climb.

In the first place, we must necessarily indicate the catastrophic economic decline. Last January the national income and industrial production were variously estimated to have dropped by 17 percent. Coal, oil and rolled metal output declined respectively by 10, 12, and 27 percent. Meanwile the drop in the GNP is obviously near 17 percent. Note that as soon as a 20 percent drop is reached we may envisage

the onset of economic collapse. World practice demonstrates that there can be no stable currency in a country where production gasps for breath.

In the second place, due to the USSR's political disintegration the Russian government is obliged to implement its financial reforms exclusively within the Russian Federation which is, in effect, only part, even though the greater part, of a thus far integrated economic complex. When the populations of the independent states have one and the same ruble, when 95 percent of operating enterprises get at least one complementing part from abroad, that is from the other republics, any economic reform, especially as regards its financial aspect, must necessarily be implemented only in a coordinated way and still better from one central point. However, that does not exist and thus far political considerations rule it out.

Finally, the multiplicity of hard currency rates of exchange in this country unquestionably menace ruble stability. The government's attempt to abolish the previously operating official, tourist, commercial and numerous other ruble rates of exchange which so manifestly betrayed a weak financial system got nowhere. Today we see piling up a still more complex cumbersome pattern of currency rates of exchange, which even have the experts muddled.

The only difference is that considered official today is the market ruble rate of exchange, which the Russian Central Bank quotes on the basis of an average as computed from the deals handled between banks and stock exchanges and at various auctions. However, due to the embryonic hard currency market, the poorly developed system of inter-bank information exchange, and the extremely narrow range of hard currency goods, the said market rate of exchange is no more realistic than the USSR State Bank's previously nonsensical rate according to which one dollar was equivalent to 64 kopeks.

Nevertheless this market rate already represents the basis for computing a special commercial rate in percentage to the market rate. The said rate is a most favourable one, with one dollar equivalent to 5.4 rubles as regards hard currency sales concerned with foreign travel expenses for officials. Finally, the former Aeroflot (Soviet Airlines) vends tickets computed generally from a rate of its own invention whereby one dollar is equivalent to 28 rubles.

The sixes and sevens in rates of exchange, which are getting worse, clearly betrays a weak governmental fiscal policy coupled with the lack of adequate leverage for controlling finance.

Not so bad as painted

Leonid Kosals,
Cand.Sc.(Econ.)

Though they do not accept a market economy, the bosses of the military industrial complex are willing to implement market reforms. A paradox, but one borne out by a survey of the head managers of the largest defence plants.

Provided the Russian government furnishes in the foreseable future serious incentives for initiating reforms at large enterprises, the military-industrial complex would not oppose that. The said conclusion is illustrated by an early January poll of 312 head managers of the largest heavy industry enterprises in Russia that was conducted at Gennady Burbulis's request by a team under Rosalina Ryvkina and Vladimir Kossov from the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Studies, conjointly with the *Kontur* Research Centre of the Russian President's Federal Agency of Governmental Liaison and Public Relations.

Nearly half interviewed believed the system of centralized economic administration should be restored to revert affairs back to normal. Demands to "rebuild ruptured economic links" and "stop exporting Russia's raw materials" concealed earnings for the old system. The government should furnish enterprises with material and technological resources.

Nevertheless, 34 percent of the number polled planned to privatize their enterprises or transform them into stock companies soon; 13 percent contemplated attracting foreign investment while another 37 percent intended to convert. Only 7 percent were against change.

What is the biggest headache?

Of the number polled 80 percent, especially in central and northern Russia, complained of the rupture of traditional economic ties, another 18 percent of the small volume of state orders, and 7 percent of the absence of guaranteed sales.

Novel demands were also voiced. The heads even of defence enterprises are displeased with what they call the adverse actions of power structures with 45 percent grumbling about overly high taxation and delayed privatization; 44 percent were displeased that they could not freely purchase raw and other materials and technical equipment.

In the upshot, only 9 percent considered the situation at their respective enterprises stable.

True, only 3 percent anticipated improvement by the end of March. Another 13 percent believed there will be no improvement at all, while 84 percent thought the situation will worsen. They observed that facilities were operating only at two-thirds of their capacities. Here the worst consequence is unemployment. The head managers of facilities not operating at full capacity believed they would have to lay off an average of 26 percent of their personnel.

Considering likely social conflicts will the enterprises be able to sack so many employees? Evidently some will not be able generally to lay off the necessary proportion of personnel, which means that conversion and growing efficiency would come into question.

Two of every three managers said that personnel were contemplating strike action. It is quite likely though that such estimates should be viewed with some scepticism. At any rate, only one out of every three said his employees were quiet with this most in evidence in the Volga Basin, the city of Moscow, and the Volga-Vyatka area.

What do workers want?

It appears that 84 percent want more pay, a demand that is most acute in northern Russia, the Volga Basin and the city of Moscow. The situation in this respect is easier in the ethnic republics and in western Siberia.

Otherwise workers called on 28 percent of the managers to provide enough food, with this issue raised more often in eastern Siberia, the Far East and the Volga-Vyatka area.

Though demands that enterprises be turned over to work collectives are loudest, mostly in the city of Moscow, generally, only 9 percent of the head managers interviewed noted personnel demands of this nature.

Now that Mutalibov has gone

Forecast for Karabakh



Two days of picketing outside the Azerbaijanian parliament were enough to force President Mutalibov to resign. His supporters claim that at least several hundred picketing were armed and that had he called out the police, blood would have certainly been shed. On the other hand, the opposition, which by now is not the opposition, maintains that the ex-president had no social basis and no political backing which was why he could not resist the pressure exerted.

On March 5, following the sudden resignation of parliamentary Speaker Kafarova, Mutalibov offered the post to his "own" man, namely Baku Medical College chancellor Yagub Mamedov, who nevertheless tendered his resignation the very next day "in view of the inability to cooperate with incompetent president Mutalibov." Parliament refused to accept his resignation and thus the demand to oust the president which Parliament had previously rejected was now reaffirmed even though indirectly.

Actually Mutalibov's "hash" was settled not in Parliament, nor in Baku, but in Karabakh, where his national army sustained defeat after defeat.

The opposition accused Mutalibov of pro-empire and subsequently by inertia of a pro-Russian orientation. In its view, he had ever been inclined to appeal to Moscow in his effort to cope with internal issues, including Karabakh and had reneged on independent statehood. His trump card in his "pro-Moscow" game was Azerbaijan's Novo-Ogaryovo participation, for which he was rewarded by Soviet troop involvement in Armenian deportation from the Getashen and Martunashen districts last summer. However, this action, viewed as Azerbaijan's most successful military operation, failed to convince the opposition. The coordinating council of the opposition incorporating all parties except the Social Democrats, considered the Centre an unreliable ally, that would leave Azerbaijan in the lurch at any moment. Hence it believed it essential for Azerbaijan to have its own national army. Incidentally, last summer the then Social Democratic Party, whose subsequent breakaway Independent Democratic Party of Azerbaijan joined the opposition Coordinating Council, protested against army action with respect to the Armenians.

In August Mutalibov's pro-Centre orientation impelled him, in the opposition's view, to support the putsch. Though right after the putsch his rating, which had earlier been not too high at that and which only the deportation had somewhat jacked up sharply declined, he won the September elections, only because still inorganized, unstructured opposition in which views and cultural levels varied, had not been able to offer an alternative candidate.

Azerbaijan's involvement in the CIS largely served to rally the opposition, with its Coordinating Council regarding this as encroachment on independent statehood. Central, of course, was the army issue. It was held that a joint CIS army was a Soviet empire force. Further, inasmuch as Azerbaijan regarded the Karabakh problem as an internal affair, it was not the kind of problem international troops should tackle. Yielding to opposition pressure, Mutalibov most unwillingly agreed to a national army. Subsequently the new army's low combat potential was ascribed to his reluctance though, truth to tell, the formation of a national army virtually from scratch is a costly and time consuming affair.

Now the opposition accuses Mutalibov of announcing the formation of an army before it had really been created and of being responsible for the loss of raw recruits. The opposition seems to have forgotten that it had insisted upon the army's earliest formation, and had prodded the President thereto arguing that after the USSR's disintegration Russia would be more inclined to adopt a pro-Armenian stance.

Under Mutalibov, Azerbaijan scored several definite diplomatic successes. Thus, it was admitted to UN membership as within its present frontiers, diplomatic relationships were established across the board, and amicable links were set up with Turkey. However, all that did not atone for the military debacle, inasmuch as the opposition seems to seriously think that the Karabakh problem can be settled on the battlefield, not through diplomacy.

What may we expect? Armenia is pessimistic, believing that now after Mutalibov, "penalized" for "failing to resolve the Karabakh problem", his successors will take a tougher approach. Their sole consolation is that in power the "hawks" will be forced to demonstrate a pragmatic policy.

Social Democrat leaders take a most gloomy view of the future. "Fascism is in the saddle," Araz Ali Zade one of his party's co-chairmen, laconically told me. He expects the frantic and consequently abortive attempts to form a combat-worthy army will spell still greater losses of life, an openly anti-Russian foreign policy, and immediate withdrawal from the CIS. The opinion is voiced that revanchists from the erstwhile Communist nomenclatura ousted moderate reformer Mutalibov. This is claimed to be the handiwork of the supporters of Geidar Aliyev and Gasan Gasanov, who have used the Popular Front and opposition Coordinating Council as the cat's paw. However, the Coordinating Council thinks that to all practical intents there has been no change in the power structure or in the national leadership except for Mutalibov's exit. They do not expect any sharp political turnabout, although it is already said that Azerbaijan might withdraw from the CIS.

Galina Kovalskaya

Nothing to choose from

Sociologist believes the worsening Dniester conflict menaces not only Moldova and the CIS but also Europe and even the UN

Kseniya Myalo

Against the background of a real shooting war in the Transcaucasia, the latest flare-up in the Dniester area ion would seem to clarify CIS prospects and reveal that all likelihood of resolving conflicts by legal negotiation is on the way out.

Nor does the UN admission in one go of all former Soviet republics, with the exception of Georgia, impart greater hope of peaceful coexistence, the more so as Armenia and Azerbaijan, though now UN members, are at war with one another. UN preference to ignore that and the wholesale violation of human rights in the former Baltic republics rather indicates a desire to legalize the USSR's disintegration than to help resolve the growing bloody conflicts in that part of the world.

In that respect the bloody conflict in Dubossary which started on March 2, on the very day Moldova was admitted to UN membership, may be seen as an evil omen for both the UN and potential Moldavian statehood. That Kishinev does not control almost half the territory presumably within its jurisdiction – note that such control is customarily required for international acknowledgement – was well in evidence at least two years ago when the Gagauz and Dniester Republics were proclaimed. Which is of no mean significance as not "separatists" encroached upon the integrity of a subject of international law and a member of the UN, but rather the UN slighted norms of international law when constitutionalizing a subject yet to be formed.

The media already note a "new Yugoslavia." However, the analogy is a purely outer one. Unlike Yugoslavia Moldova was not a subject of international law at the time the conflict flared up there and, in effect, had no history, provided we discount the Soviet-proclaimed chapter. This does not of course refer to the Moldiavan people whose history is much older. I mean the history of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, now the Republic of Moldova. As recent developments have shown, this republic has no concept of statehood acceptable to all its ethnic units, nor a national consensus proceeding therefrom. Though the objectives the Popular Front of Moldova and subsequently that country's leadership enunciated with respect to the revival of the Moldavian tongue and culture and historical self-realization may arouse understanding and sympathy, they certainly do not serve as a rallying point for the republic's multinational population. On the contrary, they have only confirmed that Moldova is not a **nation** in the generally accepted sense, as incidentally is recorded in the UN Charter, **that is a historically established cultural and political, but by no means ethnic, community, acting externally as one integral unit and itself aware that it is such an entity.**

In Moldova both factors are absent, indeed were always absent. That peculiar multiethnic symbiosis comprising its "peacetime" population should rather be qualified as a Bessarabian regional community, not a national entity, as we have indicated. This community incorporated not only the Gagauzes but also a rather numerous Bulgarian population and also Russians and what are known as right-bank Ukrainians.

By adopting at once a policy of withdrawal the Moldova Popular Front and leadership inevitably provoked self-defence from the Left Bank Region, which generally has always gravitated to a totally different regional community, Novorossia, and which **always** identified itself with Russia proper. Moreover, by proclaiming the national identity between Moldavians and Romanians, they thus disrupted the historically established Bessarabian community.

Though Moldavians have every right to the choice of identity, that cannot be denied others. The energetic clearly defined pro-Romanian orientation which Moldova's leadership chose, acutely posed the issue of self-identification for other ethnic groups.

Consequently the problem so clearly defined in Moldova but already observable elsewhere, may be worded as follows: Is it possible, having abolished the USSR, to sanctify in the eyes of international law all the state-territorial formations this USSR created, without encroaching upon the individual's fundamental right to his or her own cultural and historical identity and without provoking widescale conflict?

Apparently the US and international representatives who visited Moldova before its recognition, overlooked this dominant problem though it will definitely play an increasing role in further developments within CIS.

Now that another eight people have been killed in the Dniester area, whose people believe themselves almost alone in their grief, the situation there has assumed a new quality. The Right Bank is mobilizing and there is talk of arms deliveries from Romania. The manifestly unequal odds play a definitive role and hence developments may follow three different paths.

The least likeliest option

The Dniester area leadership abandons further struggle and accepts the status of a free economic zone as the pay-off. This results in a brief lull, which soon yields to a still greater conflict, as for the Dniester population to exploit the advantages this status offers what first must be done is to repeal the discriminatory laws on language and the like, which incidentally prodded division, and also abandon the Romanianization of every aspect of life, which, in turn, would require scrapping the policy Moldova adopted in 1989.

The little likely option

Aware of the inherent dangers and the impermissibility of ignoring the Dniester area, the CIS leaders and the Moldavian and Russian leadership recognize it as a political subject, with forms that would least encroach upon Moldova's interests. The notion of a federation of three republics, which the Gagauzes and the Dniester population suggested earlier, in reanimated.

However, that would imply abandoning reunification with Romania, against which the Popular Front will angrily protest and which will escalate tensions.

The likeliest option

The Dniester population prepares to resist with partly guerrilla warfare involving volunteers from Russia and Ukraine. Romania will now step in and this will broaden the area of conflict to incorporate the Carpathians and the Balkans. The world community will be faced with the need to extinguish a new hotbed in Southeast Europe.

The rise of the "new Europe" or the post-USSR world is already accompanied by so much conflict and bloodshed that it would be only logical to ask whether the UN as the focus of the world community is capable of coping with this new situation ensuing from the USSR's disintegration. Let me put this question still more acutely: Can the UN in the foreseeable future survive the end not simply of one of its members, but of the pillars of that postwar world which created it and which it undertook to personify?

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

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YOUR INCOMES!

AVIS

The anatomy of the Fifth Directorate

That modern inquisition known as the KGB's Fifth Directorate played a special part in preparing for the putsch. There follows an interview with Lt. Col. **Alexander KICHIKHIN** of State Security.

– When was this Fifth Directorate instituted?

– In 1967. I personally joined it in 1977.

– What preceded it?

– Actually it existed before Khrushchev's time. After sundry reshuffles, it was incorporated in the Second Chief Directorate which engaged in counterintelligence. In 1967, it was made autonomous.

– How large a staff did it have?

– Some 200, when I joined. Then it was the smallest directorate, as the others had thousands of personnel. True, before the Moscow Olympic Games, there were already 600 personnel, with all subdivisions inflated. Whereas before, there had been but a small subdivision covering sports and sportsmen, during the Olympic Games, 500 of our personnel were assigned, and more were attached from other subdivisions.

– What was the staff like? Did they stand out in the KGB generally?

– We differed from all other directorates in that we had very few of the "gilded youth" or people with ties.

– Was it thought non-prestigious?

– All with connections preferred the First Chief Directorate or intelligence, as that was the surest way to get abroad. Yet we personally believed our Directorate more important.

– Why so?

– The Fifth Directorate best knew what was taking place in society. Intelligence was occupied with foreign affairs, while counterintelligence dealt largely with foreigners. Only we did the spade work, analyzing social moods and processes. We saw life not from a chauffered car and studied it not on the basis of foreign press reports. Not every person could do the job; indeed, it is most unpleasant to rake the muck of daily life.

– Did anyone give up because of that?

– Those who did were those who wanted to live the life of elite and be in contact with foreigners. Only those who realized our work was needed stayed.

– What was your purpose?

– We believed the country's leaders needed our analysis of social processes, as enabling them to take the right decisions and correct what was wrong. That was how we were indoctrinated.

– By the KGB's chiefs?

Before, there were KGB officers on President Gorbachev's staff. Now they will be on President Yeltsin's staff

– This was dinned into our heads at every conference. Personnel were constantly brainwashed from the top down and vice versa, i.e., we brainwashed one another.

– Whom did you have as your chief?

– General Filipp Bobkov. He headed us for fifteen years, and even when appointed deputy KGB chairman continued to keep us under his eye. He interviewed every single newcomer. When he was Directorate chief, the atmosphere was such that it was almost impossible to conceal incompetence and idleness. As a result, our officers were most competent.

– General Bobkov is counted responsible for the entire drive against dissidents.

– Well, if not for Bobkov, 1937 methods would have been employed. He transmuted directives from the CPSU Central Committee that he was obliged to implement into orders not to liquidate people, but win them over. I think he was most competent. However, he could not transcend the limitations of a system based on orders from superiors and grassroots information. I spent ten years there dealing with the affairs of repressed ethnic units, and so I might note that from 1969 on we notified the CPSU Central Committee that it was vital to restore the Soviet Germans' autonomy. Both Bobkov and Andropov backed us up on that score. There were likewise several other aspects as regards which Bobkov, being aware of what was really going on in the country, took a most sensible stand. He was a politician and consequently urged political decisions, but the Central Committee refused to accept that telling us to employ our special methods.



– Your methods were at variance with your ideas. Who was appointed Directorate chief when Bobkov was made Andropov's deputy?

– General Ivan Abramov.

– What is your opinion of him?

– Behind his back he was nicknamed Ivan the Stick. Whereas Bobkov least of all sought to do the bidding of others, Abramov was his complete opposite.

– Why, then, did Bobkov make him first his deputy and then his successor?

–In the KGB, careers were made due not to ability, but connections. Which was valid for Abramov. He was a very cruel man. We knew that Bobkov tried to play him down. When Bobkov was Directorate chief, we had no protégés. However, Abramov recruited many such people, placing them in departments offering opportunities for foreign travel. One such department was concerned with writers, painters and musicians. Its officers certainly had their wits about them. Thus, they would sequester art albums and booklets from "penalized" painters and use them as gifts. Another department dealing with youth affairs would arrange to have needed sons and daughters enrolled at the University, with the respective lists drawn up as soon as the University entrance examinations in July came nearer.

– You say that the officers in the Directorate had a very good idea of what was going on in the country. In that case, they should have least of all busied themselves with the drive against dissidents, but should have offered totally different solutions.

– When collecting and analyzing the information on social processes, we obtained an authentic picture of what was going on. But when referring our reports to the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, we had to coach them in a manner according with the Communist Party line.

– With what results?

– Take the Crimean Tatars, who were so much of a thorn in the side of the top echelons of power. We were instructed "to prevent extremist actions," implying acts of terror, disruption of the transport network and the economy, and strikes. We did all that. But we also realized that this movement would not abate until the problem was settled. Through our reports to the Central Committee we naturally named extremists, we also suggested ways and means of achieving a political solution. However, Staraya Ploshchad (the CC CPSU headquarters. – **Ed.)** didn't want to lift a finger. We were told by word of mouth only, of course, to jail the activists.

– How could a competent officer who, as you say, had such a good idea of what was actually going on, take a hand in muzzling the cream of the nation, the intelligentsia?

– Put yourself in the place of such an officer. If you don't consider dangerous what your superiors consider dangerous, you'll simply be sacked. Many officers attuned themselves to our superiors, reporting what they wanted to hear. Thus, if the general thought that the writer so-and-so was no good, how could I say this was not so?

– The recently publicized material on Fifth Directorate activities points to massive KGB infiltration of all creative workers' unions, theatres and the cinema.

– Some volunteered to collaborate, because they believed that what they were doing was what the state needed. I mean that they tried to use the KGB to get something very important across to the country's

What departments did the Fifth Directorate have?



Filipp Bobkov, for many years the head inquisitor, was sometimes said to be the best of all possible options

Ivan Abramov, who replaced Bobkov as Fifth Directorate Chief, was not missed even by former colleagues when he went

There was a department covering the intelligentsia, another dealing with interethnic relationships, where I worked, and a third interested in student youth and punks, hippies and our homemade fascists. One of the biggest was the department concerned with religion. One department traced poison-pen writers and persons hatching acts of terror, as before starting out they usually sent unsigned letters to various editorial officers. Then we had a department engaged in the drive against Zionism, which Bobkov personally oversaw. Another independent department was the one preoccupied with the more noteworthy dissidents, such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. There was also a department working against Radio Liberty and NTS, (the Narodny Trudovoi Soyuz). Finally, we had a very small department that liaised with the special services of what we then called the Friends, that is, colleagues from the socialist countries.



Drawing from the magazine Der Spiegel (Germany)

leadership and somehow get matters to improve. Now, though, that might sound naive today, there were some people of that cast of mind. Others helped in order to carve out a career or obtain material advantages. Thus we helped them get a book published, go abroad, or even obtain a flat phone.

– Did you pay undercover agents much?

– Such paid agents were rare, as the people we used didn't need the money. We did present flowers to the women among these agents on March 8, International Women's Day.

– What kind of a mood was uppermost at the Directorate in 1985?

– I think that some 60-70 percent of the officers hoped for serious change. We ourselves were changing as in the process many officers started to side, in effect, with those against whom they were working. I, for instance, sided with the Soviet Germans, realizing that they needed autonomy. It couldn't be otherwise if one sought to work for the common weal, and not impose a muzzle.

– If two thirds of the personnel wanted changes, the KGB must have been the state's most progressive institution and perestroika could have taken off from Lubyanka.

– You've got to understand that the KGB kept taking on Party cadres: YCL and Party functionaries.

– Did they like switching to this what we may call specific work?

– Of course. They thus got to Moscow and were appointed chiefs with good pay. As nobody wants to part with competent people, the men we got were throwaways. However, they called the tune.

– What really took place in the KGB when Gorbachev initiated his reforms?

– Some KGB officers then came out in the media for the first time to describe what the KGB was really like. I have in mind General Kalugin, Colonel Victor Karpovich, Vladimir Morozov of the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), plus 64 officers from the Sverdlovsk KGB Regional Division. They were harrassed with Kryuchkov reportedly issuing the order to settle the hash of all 64 from Sverdlovsk in two or three years. The Fifth Directorate had already realized that a complete overhaul was essential and we were already discussing the new arrangement.

– Among yourselves or out in the open?

– Everywhere, at conferences and at Party meetings. We also appealed to Bobkov and to Abramov. Everybody seemed to approve and said that we had our heads screwed on the right way. Subsequently the Central Committee decided to restructure the Fifth Directorate. Bobkov himself drafted the new statute. It was renamed the Directorate for the Protection of the Constitution, and the more odious subdivisions, for instance, that assigned the drive against Zionism, were abolished. We also had to control joint ventures in the humanitarian field. On the whole, though, this was nothing but a facelift, with the Directorate continuing along the old lines.

– How did you take that?

– Little by little we felt that the KGB was being involved in counter-reform action. Many, especially youngsters, dropped out. Thus, in the first six months of 1991, some 600 quit. Many more would have gone, but all having lenghty service records had to give thought to retirement pensions which, as in the army, depend on seniority. After some 15 years with the KGB one would be sorry to lose pensional privileges.

– Who, then, set the tune?

– I think only 10 percent of KGB officers were real professionals who sought to keep within the confines of the law regardless of what their superiors wanted. Some 15 percent comprised the KGB's backbone of former Party functionaries. The remainder vacillated depending on which way the winds blew. I think this breakdown was responsible for the collapse of the August coup. The plotters failed to realize that the KGB was no longer monolithic, that now it was more in the way of layered cake.

– Did the KGB chiefs do anything to gird personnel for involvement in the putsch?

– I think there was no need to persuade the chiefs or the former Party functionaries, as they well realized that the further reform would only deprive them of their sinecures. All others were brainwashed, it being drummed into heads for years running that the democrats were the enemy. In April-May 1991, we began to be invited to "get-togethers with interesting people." Before, athletes, cosmonauts and actors had been invited, but now it was the entire editorial board of the newspaper *Sovietskaya Rossia,* with a packed audience of KGB officers giving them a standing ovation. People's Deputies Alksnis and Kogan were also accorded a rousing welcome. When Alksnis said President Gorbachev did not accord with public interests, there was a burst of applause. In short, the personnel of a crucial law enforcement agency acclaimed a pronouncement directed against the lawful President. No doubt you will remember that at a closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Vladimir Kryuchkov delivered a lengthy harangue spearheaded against Gorbachev's reforms. It was not featured in the media, but copies of it were circulated amongst all KGB subdivisions, with the order that it be read out to every single officer. This was nothing but brainwashing.

– What occurred in your Directorate just before the putsch?

– Again there were sixes and sevens. In our Directorate, officers openly resigned CPSU membership, though the Party local sought to obstruct that.

– When General Abramov was transferred to the USSR Procurator's Office, who was made Directorate chief?

– General Yevgeny Ivanov. For several years he served as instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Department for Administrative Bodies. Subsequently, he joined our Second Chief Directorate before again rejoining the Central Committee and then coming back to the KGB as our directorate chief. The personnel flow between Staraya Ploshchad and Dzerzhinsky Square (the KGB headquarters. – **Ed.**) was well organized. Placed with the Central Committee were people who were to be helped up the ladder. However, later, when Gorbachev became President, KGB officers were dispatched not to Staraya Ploshchad, but to join his staff at the Kremlin.

– Was that also for purposes of pushing them up the ladder?

– Not so. Rather was this infiltration of Gorbachev's staff, with Kryuchkov sending there officers he could trust, such as Evgeny Bystrov, hitherto chief of the KGB's 12th Department engaged in telephone tapping, or Yuri Kobyakov, who always unswervingly followed every directive his superiors issued.

One wonders in what capacity KGB officers were infiltrated into President Gorbachev's staff. Was this openly as KGB officers? But what could they do there, on Gorbachev's staff? Or was their real calling concealed? If so, that meant they were working for the KGB, for Kryuchkov, not for the President. In that case, where did they draw their pay, at the Kremlin or on Dzerzhinsky Square? I think these by no means superfluous questions. Now State Security officers will, no doubt, be infiltrated into President Yeltsin's staff.

Inteviewer:
Leonid Mlechin

KGB officer vs. New Times

The smell of money

An officer of the former KGB Fifth Directorate who before and during the putsch was on the USSR President's staff hankers to bring *New Times* to the dock. The compensation he wants for the "insult to honour and dignity" climbs and now amounts to almost one million rubles. Kobyakov's claim follows.

● Turn to pp.12-14 for an anatomy of the former Fifth Directorate

On December 2, 1991, I presented a People's Court with a law suit to protect my honour and dignity and secure compensation for moral damages caused as the result of the weekly *New Times* publication of A.N.Kichikhin's contribution "The KGB knew everything and acted accordingly." Considering the gravity of the slanderous accusation of supposed "involvement" in a state crime, that of high treason in the form of a plot to seize power, which *New Times* laid out my door, plus other factors, the compensation desired stood at 240,000 rubles.

More than two months have passed since I lodged my suit and circumstances have essentially changed. In December 1991 and especially after January 2, 1992, the ruble has rapidly depreciated and that continues.

Prestigious economic experts variously assess the scale of inflation over December 1991–January 1992. They put it at between 400 and 1,000 percent, that is between a depreciation of the ruble to a quarter and to one-tenth (see addenda).

Proceeding primarily from governmental or quasi official assessments of inflation, implying the depreciation of the ruble:

– motivated by common sense and yet against inflicting overly great financial damage upon the respondents;

– and in accord with Article 34 of the State Procedural Code of the Russian Federation;

I hereby request

that the sum of compensation demanded of the editorial offices of *New Times* and A.N.Kichikhin, be quadrupled to amount to 960,000 rubles.

Yet should in the course of judicial examination inflation cause the ruble to depreciate still further, I will be compelled to again resort to the right that Article 34 of the State Procedural Code affords and modify the sum claimed, so that it **factually** accord with the sum initially indicated on December 2, 1991.

Yu.A.Kobyakov

Addenda

Expert assessment of inflationary processes in December 1991–January 1992 based on material from the Russian press.

1. On January 24, 1992, Ye.Gaidar, Deputy Chairman of the Russian government, addressing the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet and commenting on the budget for the first quarter, declared that "...actual price intentions provide for inflation running at between 1,000 and 1,200 percent. However, **the government,** maintaining that would be equivalent to disaster **has incorporated in the draft budget inflation levels not in excess of 400–500 percent."**

(See *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* for January 25, 1992)

2.From Ye.Gaidar's speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation: "Prices will also sharply increase. Hence the inflationary levels depending on the price rise for energy **carriers augur a multiple rise in average price levels of 5,6 and 9 times."**

(See *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* No.3, for January 1992)

3.Ye.Gaidar said that in February prices will rise by 100 per cent and that before March is out they will increase another 4–4,5 times.

(The Information Television Agency in the *Novosti* newscast for January 30, 1992)

4. P.Bunich of the Presidential Advisory Council of the Russian Federation: "Prices have risen 10–12 times, not 3–4 times as promised."

(See *Moskovskaya Pravda* for January 24, 1992)

5. M.Dombrovsky, a Russian Federation government expert and former Polish Deputy Finance Minister: "...I think that over the last month (December) inflation in Russia has risen by more than 100 percent."

(See *Kuranty* for January 17, 1992)

6. P.Zhikharev, President of the Commercial Stock Savings Bank of the Russian Federation: "...The ruble has been officially depreciated ten times."

(See *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* for January 22, 1992)

7. From Moscow Prime Minister Yu.Luzhkov's speech in the Moscow City Hall on January 22: "Between January 8 and January 20 food prices increased 10–15 times."

(See *Kuranty* for January 23, 1992)

8. In December 1991 inflation in the Russian Federation ran at 20 percent. January 1992 results showed inflation running at between 700 and 720 percent. It is estimated that in the first four months of 1992 inflation will run at least at 1,100 percent.

(See analysis in *Kommersant* No.4 for January 20–27, 1992)

9. From speech of R.I.Khasbulatov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to Russian Farmer Congress: "...Hyperinflation is a present-day reality. Nobody ever planned whatever one might say that **prices would rise dozens of times."**

(See *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* for February 5, 1992)

10. Acad. T.Zaslavskaya, director of the Center for Public Opinion Studies: **"...In January prices rose 10–15 times and now and again 40 times and even more.** Meanwhile incomes only doubled or tripled, while with a large proportion of the population they did not increase at all."

(See *Moskovskaya Pravda* for February 4, 1992)



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

SECURITY PROBLEMS

Why we "joined NATO"

Pavel Bayev,
Alexander Blinnikov

CIS countries have become members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

Russia's joining NATO, the necessity and impossibility of which the political scientists have talked so much about, is now a *fait accompli*. However, the congratulations will have to be accompanied by several reservations. First of all, they weren't admitted directly into NATO, but into the Cooperation Council, specially created by it. Secondly, all members of the CIS were accepted, which makes it less of an event. And, thirdly, they accepted us into the Council so that we wouldn't be admitted to any other organization.

The General Secretary of NATO, Manfred Wörner, during his February visit to the countries of the CIS, made it quite clear that there are no plans to expand the alliance. The sixteen members intend to develop cooperation between themselves and keep their distance from the rest of the world.

So the attempt made by the Russian President to impose himself on the alliance was repulsed. True, the influential school of Atlanticists insists on continuing to form closer ties. But the advocates of a balanced Eurasianism spoke about this with alarm at the recent forum of foreign policy forces held under the hospitable roof of the MGIMO (Moscow State Institute for Foreign Relations). Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told those gathered that the "national interests of the transformed Russia in the new world" come down to being "healthy and prosperous," and then he left for Africa. Meanwhile the theoreticians tried to prove that Russia has no foreign policy concept.

Strange as it may be, just an amorphous nature of basic attributes of statehood (power, army, its own currency) is what makes our former adversaries want to cooperate with us. Their goal is to make the new formations on the territory of the former USSR more governable and get the conflicts between them under effective control.

What makes for European insecurity

It's difficult to overestimate the collective contribution by the Commonwealth members in the growth of insecurity in Europe. A year ago, after the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the experts coined the term "security vacuum" for Eastern and Central Europe. But this term is clearly insufficient to characterize the situation arising with the fall of the USSR. In the widening "black hole," the CSCE shaky structures vanished right before our eyes and it is now clear in regard to the coming meeting "Helsinki-2" that 11 new full-fledged members are too heavy a burden for this organization. The principle of a consensus deprives the CSCE even of a minimum ability to act, something the Security Council gives the United Nations.



Manfred Wörner. NATO will keep distance
Photo from the magazine Der Spiegel (Germany)

The North Atlantic Alliance firmly intends to avoid such a fate, but it could find itself on the periphery of European security. The powerful military machine proved useless to meet new challenges like in the case of Yugoslavia. At the same time, it is worth considering the arguments of the famous American expert, Robert Blackwill, adduced during a seminar at the Institute of Europe: only NATO could deter the Yugoslavian war, by prohibiting (not even resorting to force) the use of aircraft, navy and large tank units in combat actions. Moreover, a weighty political mandate was necessary, but the members of the alliance were not able to issue one.

The North Atlantic Alliance formulated its own

conclusions in the Rome Declaration of last December. Besides the general statements about going over to partnership relations, this document contains the proposal to form a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the participation of the former members of the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. At the first session of this body last December, our ambassador Nikolai Afanasyevsky had to live through some unpleasant hours trying to explain to the ministers there what had happened during the Belovezhskaya Pushcha meeting and why it was necessary to avoid any mention of the USSR in the communiqué. Nor was it easy to explain that the "not" left out of Yeltsin's statement: "Today we raise the question of Russia's joining NATO," in principle doesn't change its sense.

It can't be said that by the second session of the Council the problem of what to do about the situation occuring "east of Brest" was resolved. However, the necessity to take urgent measures had become even more clear. In mid-January, the NATO Committee for Economics published a report concluding that the state of the Soviet economy was too unstable to be the foundation for new political undertakings.

Especially Germany insisted on the fast acceptance of the Commonwealth into the Cooperation Council. The Yugoslavian war had become an object lesson for Germany, and the potential Russo-Ukraine conflict was a direct threat. The United States, extremely concerned over the Islamic influence in the Central Asian republics, supported West Germany's demand that all the members of the CIS be accepted into NACC. Manfred Wörner felt that this theological-political question, by the way, should be discussed with Patriarch Alexii, who had become his first interlocutor in Moscow.

It's difficult to say how useful the Cooperation Council or how effective its activities in coordinating youth exchanges, scientific contacts (not just nuclear scientists), and humanitarian assistance will be. But the main object of our Atlantic partner's attention will, unquestionably, remain the Soviet Army.

An umbrella for Eastern Europe?
Drawing from the magazine Hungarian Observer (Hungary)

Don't let friendship interfere with business

Delegations and individual visitors from NATO have been intensively reconnoitring our military strategic space lately. The goal of this almost totally unmasked activity is not so much gathering information as evaluating the possible damage in likely conflicts. Such an accumulation of information (many of the failures in our own policy have sprung from the lack of it) is justified and possibly even useful. But before letting our NATO guests through the gates of military secrets, it is necessary to intelligibly determine our priorities in military cooperation and on the whole to outline the areas where our interests correspond or differ with theirs.

The most important common interest, evidently, is normalization of the political role of the army. Listening to the meaningful declarations of the military leadership and tough resolutions at the officers' meetings, we tend to forget that there are no set principles of political self-determination for the armed forces. However, each visit of a civilian minister of defense and other officials from NATO reminds us about the principle of political control over the military. Naturally, cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance doesn't remove the danger of a military coup, but help in housing construction, equipping military bases and retraining officers could ease social problems which have become the main factor in the politicization of the army.

Another important, though less talked about common interest is preventing drawing the armed forces into national conflicts. First of all that goes for the demilitarization of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. To speak about normalization and harmony between them would he idealistic – the continuing course of the Ukrainian leadership as it breaks away from Russia, and the disintegration of the incorporated structures within CIS will inevitably generate conflicts. Nevertheless, the governability of this "soft confrontation" can be preserved if emotions and ambitions don't reign over analysis and calculation. It is possible that NATO will be an authoritative enough advisor for both sides.

There is also a common interest in searching for solutions to acute questions connected with the ratification of treaties on arms reductions and realizing disarmament initiatives. But here we are getting into an area where the interests of Russia and NATO differ significantly, i.e., when it comes to military reform which it is impossible to put off any longer.

The goal must be the creation of a modern army, which is small but not cheap. Such an army must be able to counter a wide spectrum of potential challenges to security coming from former parts of the USSR which have broken away, as well as from without. "A nuclear shield" protects against far from all threats. Quickly reacting armed forces are needed as well.

The West doesn't share that goal – the more Russia will have to reduce its military machine under the burden of economic problems, the more secure Europe will feel. That's the main reason the USA and NATO are ready to give credit to our one-sided reductions and applaud very poorly prepared initiatives.

It is not necessary to perceive this as craftiness and trickery in our new partners. Common political realism dictates the West to be reserved in regard to the prospects of modernization of the Russian Army. This is a problem we must solve ourselves, and the military cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance may become an important aid in its solution. But, in any case, it is necessary to get the maximum political advantage out of the situation in which NATO is more interested in open interaction than Russia.

When you hear someone knocking at your door at six in the morning, you know it's the milkman

This definition of democracy, given by Winston Churchill in his time, is very popular in Spain. The more so because milk isn't in deficit there

Sergei Muravyov,
NT correspondent

As I approached Madrid, a police patrol BMW suddenly emerged in front of my car, signalling me to pull up at the road side. I wondered what the matter was – the needle of my speedometer hovered over 70. A policeman checked my papers and explained with a polite smile: "You are not supposed to travel at under 80 kph on this expressway, señor. And I don't recommend exceeding the 120-kph speed limit, either."

The local traffic controllers' courtesy impressed me. The policeman's warning was symbolic: Europe was moving along a fine highway but, alas, at a speed other than ours, and lest the flow of civilized traffic should be delayed, we had to observe the generally accepted highway code.

A crisis. But wages keep rising

Leonardo Borrel, whom I haven't seen for five years, is not quite sure that a united Europe promises Spain – and him personally as an entrepreneur – a radiant future. "Spain is a bit calmer place than Russia, of course, but we are now having a hard time, too. Taxes are outrageous. Even granted that the Olympics and the World Exhibition in Seville are to blame, where does the meat come in? They keep dinning 'Maastricht' into our ears. Well? As a result, my suppliers have to reduce their head of livestock sharply. They will get compensated by the EC funds. Nevertheless, this means a production slump and unemployment. And who will make up for the breach of my ties with the domestic market? The wholesalers will no longer be able to guarantee an uninterrupted supply of certain brands of ham, and my bar will lose a lot of regular customers as a result."

Hard as I tried, I just couldn't feel for Leonardo. Things weren't actually as bad as all that. Leonardo forgot to mention the important fact that now he owned four bars, not one, plus a restaurant.

You've got to know Spaniards. A Spaniard always tends to make things look worse than they really are: unemployment in Spain is double Europe's average; the rate of inflation in Spain is higher than its

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Sergei Muravyov, 36, is our new Madrid correspondent. A graduate of Moscow's Foreign Languages Institute, he started his journalistic career in Novosti Press Agency, then went to Spain as a TASS correspondent and, until recently, worked as a *New Times* observer.

northern neighbours'; the telephone bills are exorbitant; the rents are the highest in Europe; taxes are murderous; the government is much worse than any other country's; and so on, and so forth...

As a matter of fact, the picture is not as black as it is painted. Unemployment relief has a minimum of 650 dollars a month, paid out for up to one year. Inflation is compensated for by a steady, if small, rise in pay. The tax burden comes from a pronounced social orientation of the economy, and is kept within limits which are reasonable by West European standards. The government actually gives the public no cause for complaint, but it is customary here to criticize it, just for form's sake, and the Spaniards do so with their typical caustic humour and well-wishing ruthlessness.

In parliament, I asked a conservative congressman, one of the fiercest critics of the Socialist cabinet's shortcomings and miscalculations, how come that the government, despite "the incurable ills" of the economy and the "mediocrity" of its ministers, had managed, nevertheless, not only to stay in office for ten years, but to increase the nation's gold currency reserve from ten to forty-odd billion dollars. "We criticize the present administration," was the reply, "not for its socialist economic policy but for an insufficient stimulation of the principles of economic liberalism, i.e. of practical effectiveness." He then pointed out the Minister of the Economy to me, and went on: "I came down on him like a ton of bricks at the last session. Sharp and emotional polemic is necessary and always useful. Do you think the Minister has taken offence? Not at all! We are having dinner together tonight. This is also a manifestation of democratic culture. Churchill's definition of democracy appeals to us Spaniards as, I am sure, it does to you Russians. He said, if I am quoting him right, that democracy means knowing for sure that someone knocking at your door at six in the morning is a milkman, not a policeman."

From the Atlantic to the Pacific

Spaniards can hardly be reproached for hypocrisy. They are fully aware of the tremendous advantages offered by integration with the rest of Europe. It is largely thanks to subsidies from the Community's structural funds that the country retains a high rate of industrial growth (3.5 percent a year). Despite high bank discount rates and an "expensive peseta" it continues to be regarded by foreign investors as a privileged place to put their capital in. Spain cultivates them, which does not mean that the country is "for sale," as was convincingly demonstrated by the Entrepreneurs' Conference '92, held in Madrid in January, and which drew big businessmen from all over Western Europe. The Conference participants discussed ways to pool their efforts over an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The tone at the Conference was set by King Juan Carlos I and by Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordoñez, who described the new sphere of common interests as "Europe with its continental prospects and a trans-Atlantic mission with enormous democratic, economic and political dimensions."

The process of building a new, united Europe can be described as a moment of truth and great trial in human history. But, as distinct from the period of inquisition and the driving of Moors and Jews from the Pyrenees, it has an openly humanist trend and has no aggressive and great-power claims.

After Maastricht, the Old World is not only the European Community and NATO in the former geo-strategic sense. Today the postulate that Eastern Europe, Russia above all, is an inalienable part of this complicated future architecture is taken as matter-of-factly as the postulate that the US is inseparable from European civilization and politics.

MADRID

Photo from the magazine National Geographic (USA)

Quite a reasonable price

"What is your view of Europe in the nineties? Are we witnessing the birth of a new superpower?" I asked Carlos WESTENDORP, Spain's Secretary of State for links with the European Community

Carlos Westendorp. Unfortunately, we have all got used to this term characteristic of the confrontation epoch. I hope this sort of vocabulary will recede into the past. Indeed, there does exist the military hegemony of the USA which possesses the latest combat equipment. We cannot say, however, that the USA leads the world in the economic sphere as well. It faces a serious challenge from Asian countries in this respect. Therefore, the European Community and the USA have to make quite a strenuous effort to meet this challenge. The EC does not aim at becoming a superpower, it only seeks to ensure stability where there is none. We in the West are moving from national states to a federation of states, the national is giving way to the supra-national. In the East, the reverse is the case. This tendency is a short-lived one, I think. The idea of unification will prevail in the East, too. In the meantime, the EC will be a linking and stabilizing factor on the continent, both economically and in the military-political sphere.

New Times. Some CIS member-states have already raised the question of integration into NATO.

C.W. To begin with, it is necessary to make clear what is going on, and what will eventually happen, in the Commonwealth. Incidentally, I do not consider it premature to speak of broadening NATO. This organization has always been a means of deterring a potential enemy. Now that the enemy is gone, the question of "why NATO and whom is it up against?" has arisen. The enormous common economic space will certainly call for a coordinated defence policy to be pursued by all the interested parties, Russia and the Ukraine included. This, however, presupposes a certain period of transition. Paradoxically, Kiev is now gravitating towards the West more than it is towards Moscow. I realize that the example of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland who have one foot in the EC, so to speak, is infecting. Many seem to be reasoning as follows: the Community offers a ready European mechanism and a model of integration – why, then, strengthen the CIS if we can use the infrastructure which already works. This is a delusion, I think. Even we Spaniards find it difficult to stand the strain of adapting ourselves to the Economic Community's unified monetary and economic policy. Russia and other CIS member-states are not ready yet, I am afraid, for such a difficult and responsible move in many respects.

NT. The European Community has its hands full as it is – judging by everything, it is in for a serious economic recession this year. Nevertheless, the EC keeps pressing for "a Europe of 35."

C.W. We can no longer confine ourselves to our exclusive problems. If we fail to cope, by joint efforts, with the CIS' problems which are of global importance, then all the monetary and defence unions planned in Maastricht will be useless. We ought to throw in our lot with the future of Russia and other states in the East of Europe. It is only in this context that a new Europe can become a realistic proposition. Western Europe shouldn't say "Be like us" but "Try to look like us in some respects, at least." Such a prospect will inevitably involve a drop in Western Europe's living standard. I am sure, though, that this is the price to be paid for our children's peaceful future.

What shall we do after the swords are beaten into plowshares?

Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, shares his thoughts about the changes in the balance of power and in the former USSR, with the *New Times* correspondent **Alexander POLYUKHOV**

New Times. In September both of us were amazed at the changes in the USSR (see *NT* No. 40/91), and today we are at times taken by the colossal advances in the world. We see the presidents of the USA and Russia striving to significantly reduce the arms arsenals. How do you view their latest efforts?

Adam Rotfeld. The events have overtaken the agreed reductions of arms. The attempts to squeeze the rapid disarmament process into a treaty framework have proven hopeless. It's good that Bush and Yeltsin understood the immediacy of doing something. They are acting individually, but with mutual understanding.

The USA and Russia are going over from defense systems based on a balance of power to a system based on a balance of interests. The initiatives of the two presidents are coordinated, and their stands taken into consideration. You know, in the past many reasoned that we'd "beat our swords into plowshares," but now we should not reason any longer, but get to plow.

N.T. In Russia the enthusiasm over all the money freed up from disarmament has died somehow. On paper it seems like a lot, but in life it's not noticeable.

A.R. Currently the purchase of arms is diminishing as well as the arms arsenals. Though scientific research is still being conducted, the newest weapons will be created only on paper or on the displays of computers, and not for real. There will no longer be the cost of acquiring and maintaining the equipment, or paying the wages of the soldiers operating the equipment. It goes without saying that if suddenly there should arise a serious long-term threat to the USA or Russia, they would be able to very quickly turn out the latest arms. By the way, continuation of R&D makes it possible to keep, at least in part, the intellectual potential concentrated at the military-industrial complex, but advancing scientific-technological progress for peaceful purposes.

N.T. What about security in the East? After all this does not remove the threat nor the problem of jobs for the "army" of specialists of the military-industrial complex.

A.R. The fewer arms, the better it is for internal security in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia, as well as for the world's stability. The hotheads will have a tougher time finding a machine gun, a cannon or a bomb to fight "internal enemies" or to sell it to "friends abroad." As for the brain drain of scientists and engineers from the Soviet defense industry to countries wanting to have their own weapons of mass destruction, evidently, in one form or another, the idea of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Genscher, will have to be implemented. He proposed that such scientists be allowed to work on research projects for peacetime use. It's more lucrative for the West to give grants (scholarships for work on specific projects) to a Russian nuclear scientist somewhere near Krasnoyarsk, than to keep track of how he, for instance, makes his way to Libya through Liechtenstein.

N.T. The Soviet brain drain hasn't started yet, but the Western experts have been "draining" for a long time.

A.R. That's true. Saddam Hussein forged atomic weapons with the help of Western technology and scientists. The problem of the spread of nuclear arms and the technology of its production is of a global nature and demands a collective decision. Now the nuclear powers are actively coordinating their efforts – something unthinkable only yesterday.

However, so far there are no strict rules even in the export of conventional arms. The old rules in the USSR were made secret, and now there are none. The new governments in Eastern Europe don't fully realize their responsibility in this respect either. And the West isn't sinless either. In order not to make a real mess of things like with the arms deliveries to Iraq, it would pay to immediately come to agreement within the United Nations about one set of rules.

N.T. What would you advise Boris Yeltsin to do?

A.R. Not to lose any time looking for potatoes for Voronezh or bread for Penza, but to concentrate his attention and efforts on strategic matters. He should pick five or six key problems of importance for the whole country, and frankly tell the people: I must deal with that, you can make me answer for that, but all the rest, as is the custom in democratic countries, the competent people on the spot must answer for.

N.T. What problems do you think are the most important?

A.R. In the civilian sphere – seeing to it that the transportation runs smoothly and straightening out the currency problem. In the military – maintaining discipline and order in the army while it is being strategically "retreating" in politics and in the economy and from the former Soviet republics. Usually when the army retreats its losses are great, and the commander-in-chief doesn't lay claim to fame. But, besides Yeltsin, there's no one to bear the full brunt of it all. Neither the military officers nor the politicians at lower levels can solve the problem. Their independent attempts will do more harm than good.

N.T. But the republics collectively took it upon themselves to help out. Why should Russia have to bear so heavy a burden all alone?

SIPRI: three threats from the East

In the East, especially on the territory of the former USSR, there are at least three threats.

The first. The sudden end of centralized control over the armed forces has increased the probability of their use on the orders of some local irresponsible, and at times unknowledgeable in military matters, politicians.

The second. The poorly controlled disintegration of the largest military power in the world puts the army in an indefinite position and some officers may get big ideas and try to take over.

The third. The territorial-ethnic conflicts are replacing the communist dogmas with nationalist ideology, not even stopping at using arms against the "others" and their own people.

A.R. The armed forces both before 1917 and after it were in essence Russian. Both earlier and now "foreign" officers – Germans, Poles, Balts and Caucasians – have served in them. Now the list has grown, however the financing of the army, training of the troops, production of arms and decision making was and still is the business of Moscow. Yeltsin is right in declaring that the new Russia takes upon itself the lion's share of responsibility for the Soviet armed forces, and not only on the territory of Russia.

N.T. What do you think of the aspirations of some of the republics, for example, Ukraine, to have its own army?

A.R. Ukraine, with due respect to its potential peoplewise and economically, could not soon raise its own armed forces other than something like a national guard. To form a new army for external defense takes many years and lots of money. None of the republics, not even Russia, has either. Therefore, the question should be asked: who or what is threatening Ukraine, Russia or the other republics today? The answer is simple: the threats are not external but internal – lack of food, goods, energy and raw materials. Therefore it's necessary to carry out deep-going reductions and qualitative changes in the military sphere. And this should be done without political bickering and collectively.

The state security must be rationally built on the basis of international agreements and cooperation with former adversaries. A promising step in this direction is the Yeltsin's initiative to work out an international structure for controlling arms, their reduction, destruction and the like right up to the creation of a Russian-American anti-missile defense system of a global nature.

N.T. In principle, all the republics agree with such an approach. But when it comes to dividing up the skin of the dead bear, they demonstrate a unsightly rush and other bad manners.

Drawing from Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)

A.R. What's so surprising about that? All of them are children of the Soviet past, therefore they act, at time, according to the old system of values. So, for them a lot of arms mean a strong state. Strangely, though, they haven't learned any lessons from the sad experience of the Soviet Union which collapsed under the weight of its own armaments. And they don't seem to take notice of the examples of Japan and West Germany, who managed to become great powers not as a result of an arms race, but maintaining their military might at a reasonable level.

N.T. Don't you think you're being idealistic? After all, isn't it a pity to lose cannons, planes and ships?

A.R. At any rate, the plans of the republics to maintain a high defense capability is economically unfeasible and doomed to failure. There simply isn't the money for it. It's better not to wait while the people get tired of seeing how in hungry times the money all goes into senseless military goals, but literally today throw all financial resources into economic reconstruction. That would make it possible in time to raise the standard of living, to remove the acute internal threat to national security.

When thinking about the future defense of the young independent states – whether they are part of the Commonwealth or not – you have to look into the future in order to avoid making big mistakes. The republics, having gained their sovereignty, must not only remember about their rights, but recognize their responsibilities. Having become members of the United Nations and the CSCE they took upon themselves the obligation to preserve peace. Any false step of theirs will be strictly judged by the world and European communities.

N.T. The West demands a rational approach on the part of young republics, but far from every Western state is proceeding along the way of the rational military sufficiency. In London Yeltsin told about the strategic disarmament of Russia, while Prime Minister Major confirmed that Great Britain was continuing to build Trident submarines.

A.R. Everything has changed in the world except the way people think. Many don't realize the scale of the recent changes. And London still thinks in the old way, though its plans to increase the nuclear potential of Great Britain will not likely be fully realized.

STOCKHOLM

Adam Rotfeld's five commandments:

Decisions must be made taking into account the realities of today. And here is what they are in brief.

First of all, in reducing the national armed forces, it is not necessary to demand that the partners do the same, but you can count on them doing likewise.

Second, the faster disarmament is carried out, the better. For it would be a sin not to use a favourable historical moment to leave the next generation less worries and temptations connected with mountains of arms.

Third, the battle between the two systems is over. Now there is one system of democratic values. So the emphasis must be not on national defense, but on cooperative defense systems like NATO, CSCE and the United Nations which are based on cooperation and interdependence.

Fourth, the main threat to the contemporary world lies in unpredictable elements. Therefore the strengthening of international stability demands fighting mainly with them – with the spread of mass destruction weapons around the world and powerful armaments falling into the hands of terrorists and aggressive irresponsible governments.

Fifth, in order to decrease the danger of war, we must not only counter military, but also political risk factors. For local and civil wars are inevitable while the unresolved elementary questions of peoples' survival permit charlatans to use war as an instrument to unite the nation.

The Saar and the Crimea

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
NT correspondent

It was a curious historical coincidence – the return of the Saar to Germany was decided upon in the same 1954 when the Crimea was handed over to Ukraine and thus a mine of territorial claims was planted. However, the Saar had been an apple of discord between the Germans and the French for about four hundred years.

Richelieu's behest

The Saar first became a disputed territory after 1551 when Duke Moritz of Saxony concluded with French King Henry II an agreement of union and support for the struggle of German Protestants against Caiser Charles V. Under this agreement the lands of three Episcopates, inclusive of the would-be Saar were transferred to Paris as a "German contribution." Herny II did not fail to avail himself of the opportunity to occupy these cities and lands. Charles V tried to return the arbitrarily given away territories by force, but to no avail – on the eve of the battle which could have settled the matter his army was struck with cholera.

Moritz of Saxony's action was absolutely illegal, because, the German lands he gave away did not belong to him nor were they under his jurisdiction, which, however, disturbed Paris only very little. I wouldn't undertake to judge the legitimacy and lawfulness of the present Nikita Khruschev made to Ukraine; however, his generous gesture resembled to some extent the German Dukes generosity.

A century had passed before the French possession of the Saar was legalized by the Westphalian Peace Treaty. It was one of the first cases of the appearance in international relations of the phenomenon which centuries later was termed by lawyers "the normative power of the actual."

However, no good resulted from it, since it only encouraged Paris to continue the policy of annexing territories. The French monarchy, and primarily King Louis XIV, made the expansion of the French territory further eastwards the cornerstone of its foreign policy in order to "reach the great Rhein," as Cardinal Richelieu wrote in his last will.

More than once did foreign invasions ravage the Saar lands, and only in the 18th century a relatively peacefull period set in.

The events of the Napoleon epoch led to the annexation of the entire left-bank region of the Rhein which belonged to France up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris of 1814. After Napoleon was overthrown, the Saar remained French, which was craftily used by Talleyrand in his intrigues aimed at inciting Russia and Prussiua against each other.

Nevertheless, as early as very next year the long-desired goal was reached under the pressure of the Saar population – the Second Treaty of Paris returned the Saar to Germany.

A hundred-odd years later, after Germany was defeated in WWI, Paris would make claims for the Saar again. But it wouldn't be able to triumph – the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 would place the Saar region under the League of Nations' trusteeship. The agreement which was to be effective for 15 years stipulated that on the expiration of this term the fate of the Saar would be decided by its population through a referendum.

The once irreconcilable enemies found a peaceful solution to the long-standing dispute over the Saar Territory. Will this experience be useful for settling the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea?

15 years are an instant from the viewpoint of history, and on January 13, 1935, over 90 percent of the region's residents voted in favour of the reunion with Germany. Another 10 years later, as soon as WWII was over, Paris insistently demanded the return of the Saar. Economic reasons gained priority in 1945, as previously in 1919, – Paris counted on the rich coal deposits in the region as a compensation for the damage caused by Germany. Moreover, General de Gaulle's plans were much more far-reaching than that, he wanted to get the Rhein region together with the Saar, the economic interests being backed by the reasons of security. The demands put forward by the General were met

with opposition and discontent by the Western allies, and the Saar was given a special status. It was mentioned in the Saar Constitution adopted in 1947 that "the region was politically independent of Germany" and that as far as the economy, finances and customs regulations were concerned, it was "associated" with France. This time there was no mention about terms, let alone the opportunities for the Saar residents to decide the fate of the region themselves.

Political parties, parliament and the government emerged in the Saar, but the case was not at all closed.

It was exceedingly important for Paris to obtain "an international status for the Saar," which, according to the Constitution, would provide a legal basis for the region's independent existence and, ipso facto, was to initiate its economic "Anschluss." Paris proved capable of exerting a strong influence on the region's life and managed to actually exercise full control over it. However, the legal grounds were lacking which could be obtained only at the four victorious powers' joint consent. The Soviet refusal became the insurmountable obstacle to that. There remained only one way out – to persuade Germany to agree to a voluntary renunciation of the Saar. But how?

In 1935, 90 percent of the Saar's residents voted in favour of the reunion with Germany. A little over two decades later, the Saar's fate was decided upon, with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer having played the key role in it

Konrad Adenauer's apprehensions

Paris's stance over the Saar issue turned out to be a very delicate one. French lawyers, as evidenced by documents, were fully aware of the "situation de fait illegale" – that their case was in fact illegal. The situation was also aggravated by the prevalent pro-German mood in the region. Politicians realized that it would be impossible to obtain the Saar's independence from Germany by means of unilateral steps and that negotiations over the disputed territory were unavoidable.

Getting ready for them, Paris set itself the aim: first a de jure separation of the Saar from Germany; second, a "Saar autonomy; third, economic linkage of the Saar to France; and lastly, the settlement must be final and irrevocable.

Bonn's position was formulated by the Bundestag which unanimously demanded that the Federal government, while negotiating over the Saar issue, proceed from the necessity "to restore the law to the effect that: a) conditions for freedom and democracy be created in the Saar Territory; b) the de facto separation of the Saar Territory from Germany be terminated and its appurtenance to Germany be esteemed."



Yet Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that the settlement of the problem in its "German interpretation" is not an end in itself. He deemed it far more important to remove the bone of contention thwarting the establishment of friendly relations between yesterday's enemies and today's allies. Americans were also interested in the removal of the sore problem of the Saar which emerged very annoyingly every now and then in the course of the just initiated process of the European reunion. Although Americans explained it unambiguously to Adenauer, they did nothing to affect the Paris hard-liners, – or at least this is what German historians assert.

In this situation Bonn began to question the necessity of negotiations, preferring the policy of wait-and-see, because time worked for Germany – the French policy in the Saar stirred an increasing discontent while the economic growth in Germany served as a strong magnet.

Nevertheless, in February 1952 at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USA, France and Britain Adenauer was given to understand that it was time to sit at the negotiating table. "Private talks" between the German Chancellor and head of French diplomacy Robert Schuman took place at about the same time. There was no information concerning the content of the talks, apart from some contradictory press releases. Adenauer said that he pinned hopes on an understanding by the French side, while the decisive factor for any outcome of the negotiations must be the will of the Saar population.

It was then that the term "Europeanization" sounded in relation to the disputed territory. The two sides interpreted this notion in different ways despite the fact that the necessity to solve the problem "in the European spirit" had been discussed for more than one year. Germans suggested converting the Territory into a neutral one controlled by the European Council. As for the French, they interpreted this variant as providing them with the possibility to turn the Saar Territory into their economic zone, naturally, under their strong political control, but with a "European label." Bonn even came up with the idea of creating from the Saar, part of Lorraine and Luxemburg a first, tentative European territory having a special status and government. In the minds of German politicians, it was to become a prototype, a model for a unitary Europe – Adenauer's dream and ideal. Paris's reaction to it was painful – not a single inch of French land! Germans shrugged their shoulders: it's clear now what they think about European integration in Paris. This German trump would be used at negotiations for a long time to come.

And the negotiations progressed painfully, because neither side wanted to make concessions, although it was becoming obvious that someone had to make them in order to find a way out of the impasse. Under the conditions existing those days it could be only Germany. It was an undesirable turn of events for the Chancellor, but he was aware of a reliable internal political background – the overwhelming Christian Democratic and Christian Social majority in the Bundestag and a weak opposition. Besides, he was prompted by the understanding that if Germany made this step, it would facilitate the subsequent political reunion of Europe, the creation of a European defence community and the integration of Germany into the system of a European defence community and the integration of Germany into the system of Western alliances.

April 11, 1954. The last day of negotiations. State Secretary Walter Hallstein who spoke on behalf of the German delegation mentioned the connection which existed between the status of the Saar Territory and the development of the European community, not only defence and economic, but also political development. He was outspoken enough to admit that this step by Germany is a sacrifice the necessity of which is yet to be explained to German citizens, since the latter had turned out to be confronted by an intricate dilemma – is it admissible to undermine the unity of Europe because of a disputable issue existing between the two countries? There was no consensus over the question of European unity in those days, yet Bonn dared to make this single correct move.

Several months full of dramatic conflicts had been spent on the final revision of the text of the agreement before it was signed in Paris on October 23, and subsequently ratified by the Bundestag and the National Assembly of France. Was it Germany's defeat? Many believed at the time that this outcome spelled only a compensation by Germany for joining the Common Market and NATO, since the creation of a European defence community had triumphantly failed because of France.

The case seemed closed. However, one more procedure stipulated by the agreement was due to take place – a referendum in the Saar over only one question – the attitude towards its European status. At the last stages of negotiations Bonn took pains to persuade Paris to withdraw this point, but France was inexorable. Germany suggested that the agreement should be ratified by the freely elected Saar parliament, whereas France was apprehensive that the MPs' mood could be engineered in favour of Germany. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer categorically opposed the idea of a referendum, for he feared an upsurge of nationalist feelings which might impair the relations with France and damage the image of the new Germany.

Germans should be eternally grateful for the obstinacy Paris displayed in those days. Over two thirds of the population voted against the European Status.

Vox populi against politicians

According to German politicians who directly participated in these dramatic events, such an outcome of the referendum was not expected either in France or in Germany. However, the Chancellor who campaigned for the status admits in his memoirs that he always believed that the Saarians were good Germans and that he secretly counted on precisely this spin-off. He understood that France could not ignore the results of the referendum and fail to make political conclusions.

One circumstance is noteworthy here: the results of the 1955 referendum as such did not mean that the Saar Territory had to return under the German eagle's wings – as distinct from the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles which made the fate of the Saar dependent on the will of its residents.

Soon after, the newly elected Landtag of the Saar adopted practically unanimously – with only two Communist deputies opposing – a declaration which was in fact a demand of economic and political reunion with Germany. It is precisely this clearly expressed position that played the decisive role at the new negotiations after the referendum. They lasted for about one year and the progress was rather slow because of France's unbending position, which cost Germany a lot of effort and shrewd political strategy.

Finally, on October 27, 1956 a treaty was signed in Luxemburg which put an end to the dispute between the two countries which had lasted for many centuries. On January 1, 1957 the Saar Territory became German again.

The transition period took three years. All the necessary measures were thought out in order to avoid an abrupt severence of economic relations between the Saar and France which could result in a catastrophe for the former's million-strong population. Special measures were taken to prevent social conditions of the population from worsening and to preserve the full range of commodity circulation as well as the French market in the Saar and vice versa.

Immediately after the completion of the Saar "saga" certain German politicians came to the conclusion that the Saar precedent could become "a model for German reunion." However, the euphoria soon faded away. Three and a half decades were to pass before this model turned out necessary and practically implementable on German soil.

Will it come in handy for the settlement of the "Crimean issue?" Professional lawyers and historians must have their say in it. But will our politicians prove wise enough? Besides, we have no tradition of esteem for public opinion which in our situation can be easily manipulated in any direction. The present vacuum of power leaves little chances for success in any attempt to settle disputable issues, especially territorial ones, by legal procedures. The tragic examples of this are far from scarce.

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AVIS

SDI – something necessary

In *NT* No. 48/91 Alexei Arbatov argued against Russia participating in the creation of a joint anti-missile defence programme with the Americans.
The American diplomat disagrees with the Russian scholar

James R. Van de Velde

In his article "How to start a broken clock" Alexei Arbatov doesn't understand at all and so incorrectly interprets the new strategic situation, that it made me wonder: is this the reverse of the Cold War?

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) wasn't meant to and never will guarantee absolute protection from nuclear weapons. Washington has made an official statement about this more than once.

The SDI programme from the very first had the goal of raising the effectiveness of the deterrents, not replacing or liquidating them, thereby making a massive first nuclear strike more complicated and difficult. Likewise, the strategic means of the anti-aircraft defence didn't provide the USA nor the USSR with an inpenetrable defence, however the existence of the AA defence system made it so that plans to destroy the forces of the adversary by a bomber aviation attack had no guarantee of success. And therefore the AA defence was effective.

An anti-ballistic missile defence system would make sense from a strategic point of view in the same way if it were more effective. If the ABM defence were affordable, effective (i.e., difficult to overcome) and little vulnerable, then it would make it hard for the enemy to plan and strike the first nuclear blow. The SDI programme was begun to create such a system. I am convinced that it is possible.

Now SDI has other goals. In the USA they admit that the strategic situation has changed. In his "State of the Union" address in January, 1991, George Bush announced that in connection with the improved relations between our two countries it is no longer necessary to build up means for preventing a sudden nuclear attack.

At the same time the President foresaw changes in the international situation and the appearance of ballistic missiles in the arsenals of the Third World countries which are less rational and careful in their approach to questions of deterrence and nuclear strategy than the USA and the former Soviet Union. Therefore the President has reoriented the SDI programme to the neutralization of the growing threat from the Third World and simultaneously cut back radically the number of forces deployed for defence purposes. Therefore, the new plan is only half the dimensions of the old one. Besides, in the new plan much emphasis is put on antimissiles for intercepting tactical ballistic missiles. The new plan "Global Defence Against a Limited Strike (GDLS) differs significantly from the old plan. It is on a much smaller scale and is directed against the new threat: a sudden strike from the Third World or a possible unauthorized launching.

The republics of the former Soviet Union don't need to worry about whether they have enough forces for retaliation. The plan could be useful for them as well. For example, the project Brilliant Pebbles – small missiles without warheads that float in outer space and are able to intercept any missile – could provide the republics with the necessary defence.

During the Gulf War this programme could have served as a defence from the Scud missiles of Saddam Hussein. The AMB ships could set out for any hot spot. On the whole, an effective defence could be the decisive factor convincing the Third World countries not to go about the expensive production of ballistic missiles.

The matter causing the most concern and alarm is what to do about the Third World countries that acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles?

Alexei Arbatov is absolutely right in saying that it is necessary to undertake all possible diplomatic and economic measures in order to stop the spread of ballistic missiles in the world. It is known that the USA has headed and now heads these efforts, and the Soviet Union only followed in our step. Guarantees of security, control over armaments, control over the exports and technology, sanctions – all these must remain an integral part of the counteraction against the spread of ballistic missiles. Arbatov should take note that in the Gulf, the Patriot missiles had to intercept not American missiles, but the Soviet Scud missiles.

An active ABM defence is only one link in the chain of measures necessary to solve the problem of the spread of ballistic missiles and their warheads.

Imperfect as it may be, the ABM defence system has many advantages:

First of all, it could force some countries not to embark on the production of expensive ballistic missiles.

Secondly, it is an effective defence against unauthorized ballistic missiles launches.

Thirdly, the Gulf War showed that the ABM defence decreases the danger of using ballistic missiles as instruments of political coercion.

Fourthly, doing away with the illusion about the necessity of getting ahead of the adversary, the ABM defence increases stability and thus helps prevent wars.

Fifth, an ABM defence system saves the human lives.

Because of their long-range operation, ballistic missiles permit the aggressor to drag into the conflict countries located quite far from each other. This is particularly dangerous because the conflict can quickly spread and be aggravated. Reducing the threat resulting from ballistic missiles you prevent the danger of the conflict spreading. Therefore the ABM defence system has a stabilizing effect and meets the security demands of the future. Bush's programme for developing the GDLS plan is very promising.

Now we must no longer be restricted by the ABM Treaty. The treaty has become obsolete today. Its main goal – to restrain the USSR and the USA from making offensive weapons – was never achieved. The appearance of missiles in the Third World undermines the viability and effectiveness of the treaty.

The non-nuclear properties of the ABM defence pose no threat. It would be unwise to revel in the success of our new relations, when the disintegration of the former bipolar world is generating new threats to security. Only through common efforts can we create a better and more stable world.

GENEVA

This letter was sent to The Edltors already translated into Russian with the attached note:

The author is the secretary of the American delegation at the negotiations on defence and outer space. The opinion expressed in this letter is exclusively the opinion of the author and does not necessarily correspond to the opinion of the US government.

Will Basques disrupt the Olympic Games?

Oleg Vishnyakov

The summer Olympic Games are to open in Barcelona on June 25. But the Spanish police are already on the alert. Gunmen from the Basque terrorist organization ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), fighting for Vasconia's independence from Madrid, vowed to make the Games their next target. Another show of force was organized in January. They shot two servicemen dead in Barcelona and exploded a bomb in the very centre of the capital. In mid-February three persons were killed in a bomb car explosion in the city of Santander.

The government has allocated around 400 million dollars to tighten up security during the Games, and an additional 15,000 secret service agents are to be enlisted. However, no one is prepared to give guarantees. The professionalism of ETA gunmen is well known. During 23 years of armed struggle more than 700 people have become victims of the terrorists.

Franco died, patriots became terrorists

Basques like to say that they are not Spanish. They live in the valleys and wooded mountains of northern Spain and have their own language, customs, cuisine and flag. Euskadi, as Basques call their country, has a centuries-old history. At the turn of the 16th century King Ferdinand II of Aragon won a greater part of the peninsula back from the Moors, and three Basque provinces – Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Alava – voluntarily joined united Spain. In reward for this they enjoyed autonomy for 350 years. The Basque land had its parliament, army and currency.

During the civil war the three provinces took the side of the Republicans and proclaimed the Basque Republic. Franco dealt cruelly with the rebels. An intensified Hispanization of Vasconia began. The language of the Basques – Euskara – was banned. Those who dared hang the national flag could get into the police commissariat from which only a few returned.

ETA committed its first terrorist acts in the late 1960s. Incidentally, *abertzale* (patriots) merely responded to terror by terror. It was justified by "the lofty aim" of liberating Euskadi from the fascist dictatorship.

The democratic government of Adolfo Suarez, which replaced the Franco regime in 1976, tried to moderate the separatist sentiments of the Basques. It declared an amnesty for political prisoners. Even the most radical political parties were legalized. The document known as the Status of Guernica and approved at a referendum held in the three Basque provinces in October 1979, laid a legal basis for the autonomy of Euskadi. However, ETA continued an armed struggle. The "anti-Franco resistance fighters" turned into common terrorists.

Basque terrorist leaders are either in prison or in exile. But assassinations continue

Students of Havana University

The police do not have exact information about the number of ETA members. The leaders of the organization usually reply to journalists: "Our numbers are legion." ETA has a rule unfailingly practiced by several generations of revolutionaries: each member knows only direct "brothers-in-arms." ETA "cells" often conduct their operations without coordinating them with the "centre." This complicates the job of the police. At present, al-

Five people were killed in a car explosion in the Cruz Verde square in the very centre of Madrid

most no known leaders of ETA are active. However, terrorist acts continue.

The main source of ETA's considerable incomes is the "revolutionary tax" (virtually an ordinary racket) collected by terrorists from local businessmen. Kidnapping with the aim of holding the victim to ransom and even raids on banks are frequent means. In addition, the separatists receive many voluntary donations.

As a result, ETA can buy a large amount of arms. Six years ago, during a search at a furniture factory which employed several ETA members, the police found tons of weapons, including two Soviet-made ground-to-air missiles and launchers.

The struggle of the Spanish and French law-enforcement bodies against the Basque terrorists would be more effective if ETA did not have backing abroad. Among the "friendly organizations" were the Italian Red Brigades, the French Action directe, and the Irish Republican Army. Members of the Chilean terrorist organization, Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) even received training in the ETA ranks.

The Basque separatists enjoyed the favours of a number of regimes. They were cordially welcomed in Libya, Sandinista-ruled Nicaragua and South Yemen. Six members of ETA, deported under an agreement with the Spanish government to Cuba, have lived there as honourable guests. They are studying at the University of Havana and get higher scholarships. Cuba refuses to give Madrid information about the actions of ETA gunmen who found refuge on the island.

500 gunmen in prison

It was hinted early in February that ETA was prepared to suspend assassinations if the government agreed to direct talks. In the past ETA declared more than once that it was not averse to concluding a truce. But the government turned down any preliminary terms. Nevertheless, talks between government officials and ETA leaders have been conducted on a neutral territory since 1976. So far the greatest success of the dialogue is the self-dissolution of ETA's "political-military wing" in 1981. Unlike the "military wing," the "political-military" was considered more moderate. Incidentally, bombs were exploded by members of both wings. The last talks took place in Algeria in 1988. However, they yielded no result. ETA continued the war.

In February, the government did not even have time to weigh the offer of a truce: a car was blown up in the central part of Madrid. Did it mean a new split in ETA into the "moderate" and extremist wings?

ETA is having difficult times now. Only four years ago its influence spread throughout Europe. The head of the organization, Jose Urruticoechea, alias Josu Ternera, managed to direct the actions of terrorists and "correct" ETA's stand at the talks with the Spanish government in Algeria even from the investigation ward of the French prison. Today the separatists are in disarray. The reason for confusion is the recent arrest of several leaders, including Zabaleta Elosequi



The French police took several months to track down Ternera. The ETA head was arrested in January 1989

(Waldo), the "right hand" of Josu Ternera.

Two more ETA leaders for whom the police are hunting – Mugica Garmendia (Artapalo) and Luis Alvarez Santacristina (Txelis) – went into hiding in Paris. Moreover, news leaked out that Txelis had decided to give up armed struggle. It was Waldo, Artapalo and Txelis who formed ETA's leading core after the French police had arrested Josu Ternera in January 1989.

Besides this, six ETA activists are in exile in the Dominican Republic. Among them is Eugenio Etxebeste (Antxon), who led the ETA delegation in Algeria. All six are kept in Santo Domingo under house arrest. They are allowed to go shopping only under police escort.

Having isolated the ETA leaders, the Spanish authorities launched a "psychological attack" on the organization. In November 1991, the Interior Ministry made public a conversation between two gunmen held in the Nanclares de Oca prison, Alava province, and their relatives who had come for a meeting with them. Isidro Etxabe (Zumai), sentenced to 70-year imprisonment for the killing of eight persons (he had already spent 11 years in prison), and Jon Urretia had both condemned the bloody actions and now were admitting that the armed struggle was senseless.

Together with other gunmen held in the same prison, they signed a statement: "The armed actions undertaken in the last few months can become a reason for confrontation between Basques." The statement was backed by 30 more ETA members held in various prisons. It is expected that the number will grow.

In all, more than 500 Basque gunmen are held in Spanish prisons.

Jose and Irene – Basque Bonnie and Clyde

Jose Luis Urrusolo and Irene Idoia Lopez are considered the most dangerous of the ETA gunmen for whom the police are hunting



Jose and Irene head the "roving group" of terrorists noted for unprecedented cruelty. Jose is a marksman (he usually uses a pistol or Uzi gun) and an expert in explosions. He is known as "a man with a thousand faces" for his striking ability to change his appearance.

He was detained for the first time 14 years ago, on suspicion of complicity with terrorists. Shortly after that, covering up the traces after another crime, Jose was compelled to flee to France. However, later he returned to Spain and became a member of ETA's "Madrid group" which acted from 1982 to 1985. Urrusolo was entrusted with only the most high-level operations, such as an explosion in the telephone company building in the Rios Rosas street in Madrid in 1982 or the kidnapping of banker Diego Prado in March 1983.

In the last three years Urrusolo has been in ETA's "active reserve." The law-enforcement bodies had no idea about his whereabouts.

Early in December, ETA gunmen shot dead two policemen in the centre of Barcelona. The assassination was accidentally recorded by the talecamera of a local bank. Having examined the video recording, experts concluded that one of the gunmen was Jose Luis Urrusolo.

Early in January, eyewitnesses identified Urrusolo as one of those who took the life of Prof. Manuel Broseta. The professor was killed in Valencia by a shot in his head in broad daylight. This time there was a woman beside Urrusolo. The police believe that it was 28-year-old Irene Idoia, known as Margarita. She took part in two attacks on civil guardsmen in Madrid (17 people were killed and several dozen wounded) and in the preparation of several terrorist acts, including a bomb explosion near the Defence Ministry building.

Margarita has a contradictory reputation in ETA. On the one hand, she is an excellent fighter. On the other, she is not disciplined and likes discotheques and men.

Once, during an attack on an army car, Irene had to cover the retreat of gunmen. However, she decided to take part in the operation herself. She shot dead two officers with her automatic gun. On the order of ETA's high command Irene was put on the "reserve list." She spent several years in Algeria and France.

Last October, Margarita was identified in a photograph by employees of an automobile repair station who fixed her car. In less than a day this car with 35 kg of explosives in its luggage compartment was found by police on one of the Zaragoza streets.

Banning is the simplest way

The only political force in Euskadi which openly supports ETA is the ultra-left party Herri Batasuna (People's Unity). "The Basque land is occupied by a hostile army, and ETA is compelled to resort to killings," contends Jon Idigoras, one of the leaders of Herri Batasuna. The dream of the leaders of this party, called ETA's political wing, is to unite the three Basque provinces of Spain, the controversial Navarra province, and the three Basque provinces of France into a single socialist state.

Four racketeers were arrested in January in San Sebastian, Guipuzcoa province. On behalf of ETA they blackmailed two dozen businessmen, threatening them with "big troubles." It turned out that the four men were members of the Herri Batasuna party.

Inigo Iruin; a top full-time official of the Herri Batasuna and a member of the autonomous parliament, is under investigation on suspicion of extorting money. Five years ago Jon Idigoras himself was nearly put in the dock. Two terrorists, arrested in France and handed over to Spanish law-enforcement bodies, identified him as a man who organized their escape from the country. However, during a confrontation the gunmen renounced their testimony.

Felipe Gonzalez and his cabinet are criticized from all sides for ineffectiveness in the struggle against terrorists and indecision in relation to those who openly support them. True, after the recent terrorist acts in Barcelona, Madrid and Santander, Gonzalez said he would demand from the Prosecutor-General "measures" against the accomplices of ETA, having in mind, of course, Herri Batasuna. A more resolute stand was taken by Jose Maria Asnar, chairman of the leading opposition party, Alianza Popular. "We demand an immediate dissolution and banning of Herri Batasuna," he said.

Most political leaders agree, however, that such a move will not bring the desired result. In Euskadi, Herri Batasuna is backed by about 15 percent of the electorate. A ban will merely enhance the party's popularity, especially among the youth. Separatist tendencies are particularly strong among young Basques.

Many believe that ETA will die itself and regard its latest actions as a sign of despair. According to police information, there is growing support within ETA for "a peaceful way out." However, the disunity of groups and the virtual lack of united command show that, even having ceased its existence as an organization, the splintered ETA will remain dangerous for a long time.

In any case, Madrid does hope that the Olympic Games in June will be cloudless.

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AVIS

Private investigation



In Austria, private investigation is conducted by bachelors with expertise in law and psychology who can also shoot well. In India, policemen and fathers of large families are not employed as Pinkertons. In Russia and Latvia, on the contrary, Sherlock Holmeses are former policemen who have to keep their large families

Konstantin Isakov

A white Lada car began to follow Edla a Finnish girl living in Moscow, som time after she started seeing the gu her girl-friend was dating. It starte off once she went out of her house i the morning. True, she managed to get rid of th Lada in a crowded street. But, looking out of th window in the evening, Edla saw that the car wa again in front of the doorway. Tired of suspicion and conjectures, the girl phoned the Maigret pr vate detective office. In a couple of days detective found out that the Lada owner lives in the sam building next door and each morning goes t Tverskaya Street to sell bisquits...

"Unlike French detectives, we seldom deal wit love triangles, and we do not like to take such or ders," says Alexei Shlyapnikov, head of th

The father of a family is not the right man to be a detective

Vienna is one of the most safe cities in the world. However, in a hick telephone directory of he city the enumeration of de-ective agencies occupies five ages. Eye-catching adver-isements in the streets prom-se to make the life of Austrians ecure. According to official tatistics, there are about 200 rivate detective agencies in he country.

Detective agencies ap-eared at the end of the last entury, when the Hapsburg ynasty was in its heyday. In 1904 the profession of a de-ective was given an official tatus and was entered in the rades register.

To become a private detec-ive in Austria, a person must ulfil a number of preliminary onditions. He must present apers confirming his identity, ave the necessary know-edge in the fields of law, sychology and criminal law. A candidate must be a good car driver and have proficiency in arms.

Even higher demands are made on those who decide to start their own business. A person must have at least eight-year record of practical work in a detective agency, police, criminal police or other security bodies. A commission consisting of officials of the Interior Ministry, local authorities and the detectives' union will issue a license to work only after a thorough examination of a candidate's overall proficiency.

Heinz Rambousek, head of the Austrian association of detectives, explains the growing need for Pinkertons by rivalry. "Most often we work to uncover offences in insurance and the trading business," he says. "We investigate cases of manufacturing imitations of goods protected by trademark, for instance, expensive watches, jewelry and alcoholic drinks. We provide assistance in the struggle against industrial espionage, search for debtors, and check persons before their appointment to posts of responsibility."

Private detectives carry out orders for the collection of material needed for a divorce suit and inheritance, search for teenagers who joined religious sects or became drug addicts. Rambousek, who heads his own firm, Detektiv Unison, says that work of this kind "requires people not so much with iron muscles as with a clear thinking head.

"My employees," he explains, "must look equally well in jeans or a tuxedo. He must have a tenacious mind, be able to endure physical and psychological strain. In private life, he must be as free as possible. I cannot imagine among my employees the head of a family with two little children, running from shop to shop. He will be either a bad parent or a bad detective."

> A private eye doesn't have to run from shop to shop in Vienna



Anatoly Kovrigin,
NT correspondent

VIENNA

igret investigation agency. He revealed t roughly half the clients are searching things stolen from them. True, private ectives agree to help only one or two of ry 100 clients applying to the bureau. e feasibility of the order and the amount dough are taken into account. For ance, detectives prefer not to investi-e car thefts and apartment burglaries. Maigret agency employs only 15 detec-s, and they are simply not interested in estigating such cases. The fee for the ret-d carpet or TV set would hardly cover expenses involved in the investigation. agency refused to help a prostitute who rged foreign currency for her services re-the weekly earnings taken away from by an extortioner. Detectives do not clients of this kind. It also politely re-d a foreign currency dealer who asked unish his treacherous friends. Private ctives do not want to interfere in relations between black market dealers and racketeers.

Maigret values its reputation, believing that its clients are "sufficiently wealthy and primarily honest people."

"We shall have guns too"

In the past, all Maigret detectives worked for the police. Only two years ago the founders of the agency, Yuri Loktionov and Alexei Shlyapnikov, sat in one office in Petrovka 38, where the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department is situated. They were senior inspectors in the robbery and banditism investigation division.

Money for advertising was needed to start their own business, and they decided to earn it by guarding offices. True, there was considerable competition in this business. In Moscow alone several agencies are engaged in it. Among them are Alex, Stealth, MIG, Bayard, Saturn, Gerat, Protection Service Ltd., Vector, Spanish Quarter, Cerberus, Russian Detective Agency and Bell.

Some of the large firms already have their own security services. It happens that brawny fellows are entrusted not only with direct duties of protection. They are taken to meetings with intractable suppliers or debtors. This is far from a business for everyone. Hence, the high turnover of the personnel and the emergence of ever new security firms, of a more or less respectable nature.

Some 250 Maigret employees guard 12 Moscow factories and a number of offices. They will soon wear the blue uniform of the marines. Half of the Maigret headquarters is now filled with bales of new uniforms.

"The uniform disciplines people," explains Yuri Loktionov, head of the agency. Besides, the employees are soon to be

equipped with rubber clubs designed by the Maigret director himself. "Army and police truncheons do not suit us, because they are intended mainly for attack, while we need truncheons for defence." When the law on private possession of weapons is adopted, "we shall have hand guns too," Yuri Loktionov promised.

Don't be taken in

Alexei Shlyapnikov and Yuri Loktionov think that the domestic "investigation" market is not yet saturated, and therefore the interests of detective agencies rarely intersect. Now and then agencies hand over to one another a "hopeless" client whose request cannot be fulfilled, for instance, because the theft was committed long ago.

The search for debtors, the collection of information, and the finding of addresses and telephones make up a third of the orders received by Maigret.

A friend took the car for a ride and did not return. Moreover, he changed the place of work and moved to a new apartment. A telephone call to Maigret, and in a couple of days the client will have the address and telephone number of his "friend." If necessary, a detective will establish where the "friend" is hiding the car.

Several articles disappeared in the apartment after a visit by the daughter's new acquaintance. Unwilling to quarrel with the daughter, the mother wants to find out the telephone number and the place of work of the new girl-friend in order to persuade her to return the stolen things without a scandal.

Another group of orders now constitutes roughly a tenth of the total. In the opinion of Alexei Shlyapnikov, however, they determine the future of private investigation. It is the checking of a partner's reliability when entering into deals.

Not long ago, when goods were in short supply, numerous swindlers profited by the sale of certificates near hard-currency shops. They adroitly palmed off packs of faked banknotes on the person who sold these certificates. Swindlers also profited form the sale of cars. But who would deal with suspicious middle-men if a car could be bought in a shop or at an exchange? One must only have enough money for this purpose. After newspapers made public numerous cases of bamboozling the gullible, our compatriots became more cautious in their deals. Hard times have come even for the sidewalk gambling operators.

It turned out, however, that Muscovites can be cheated in various ways, by using, for example, their trust in official forms and stamps. These office attributes can be obtained today in a snap.

Detectives told me the following story. One person had access to organic raw materials worth millions of rubles and looked for someone to whom he could sell them as profitably as possible. Such a buyer appeared, and he even offered a greater sum than charged. He promised to transfer the sum from his bank account. The buyer signed a contract, sealed it with his stamp, took the raw materials, and disappeared. The seller understood that he had been taken for a ride and applied to Maigret.

> The Moscow Criminal Investigation Department has no special liking for private detectives, and Lubyanka keeps them under surveillance

Detectives ascertained that the office form and the stamp indicated a firm which was not registered anywhere and did not have any bank account. Thanks to a telephone number they found the "secretary" of the firm. It turned out that she was hired two weeks before the deal and knew absolutely nothing about it. The traces of the swindlers broke off in the office rented by them. They paid for it with a computer whose electronic "guts" had been cleaned out, leaving only a computer shell. "The operation was conducted in the best swindling traditions," Alexei Shlyapnikov noted.

Maigret itself happened to deal with a swindler when they tried to buy cars for the agency at the Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange. "We arranged for a deal with a southerner and were even prepared to sign a contract, but I did not like his eyes," Yuri Loktionov recalls. The seller was "checked." He turned out to be a big swindler who had made a fortune by promises to supply cars under fictitious contracts. Credulous buyers accurately transferred money to the Sumgait bank in Azerbaijan.

Foreign businessmen often apply to Maigret. A Spanish entrepreneur asked the agency to watch the behaviour of a negotiating partner, suspecting that the latter was double-crossing him. At the request of an American, Maigret detectives checked the legal status and bank account of a Russian businessman.

Not long ago a firm asked Maigret to investigate the theft of a xerox machine worth two million rubles, with the door and the lock remaining intact. After familiarizing themselves with the case, the police and another detective agency refused to investigate it. Yuri Loktionov offered a simple way out – to check on a lie detector all employees who had keys to the room. The firm declined Maigret's services, explaining it was too expensive – 30,000 rubles for a test.

There are curious cases too. An elderly woman living near Moscow asked Maigret to provide her with a detective and a dog in order to find two chickens stolen. As detectives were telling me about their life, a tall elderly man came to the agency. He tried to sell, for 500 rubles, the KGB's secret orders concerning external surveillance, which was accurately rewritten in a school notebook.

Is the KGB jealous of the rival?

Private detectives say that their full independence of government bodies gives them a host of advantages. Their wages are two or two and a half times higher than those of the police. There is no need to do useless paper work, for instance, to draw up plans and reports on the capture of crooks. Ordinary people get in contact with private detectives more willingly. "We find it easier to convince them to become our agents," Loktionov says. "The police seeks the cooperation of people who were caught red-handed in some offence, and they work for fear of the compromising material being made public. We seek cooperation on a commercial basis: money is paid for information."

Private detectives are prepared to exchange information with law-enforcement bodies on a mutually advantageous basis. However, the officials of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department have no special liking for private detectives. There is no mutual understanding either between private detectives and Russia's security ministry. This winter agents of the former KGB kept Yuri Loktionov under surveillance for a week. They took pictures of everyone who entered the Maigret office. After that they tapped their telephone. Yuri Loktionov does not know or did not want to say, for what purpose it was done. Such attention of the state-run special services can probably be explained by jealousy towards their new rival.

– Do private detectives use "bugs"?

– You know that eavesdropping is banned.

– Then I'll put the question in a different way: do you use all the available technical means in the interests of your clients?

– Yes.

Drawings by Rostislav Zolotaryov

Photos by Konstantin Isakov

Goliath rescues people from the gallows

In Indian legislation there are no special acts regulating the activity of private investigation agencies. To open such an agency is as easy as to open a shop or a legal advice bureau. No special permission or licence is required except registration in the list of shops and offices, which takes only two or three days.

The first investigation agency was opened in India in 1962 by Ramesh Chandra Madan. By that time Ramesh had tried 22 professions. He was a coolie, rickshaw man, junkman, balloon seller, cinema ticket collector, singer and artist. Private investigation became his serious occupation for a long time. In 1989 the International council of private detectives chose Ramesh as the best detective of the year.

Today Ramesh Chandra Madan, 54, heads the all-India association of private detectives and the association of private security services. Besides, he is director-general of the Goliath Detectives Ltd. Under his direction over 3,000 guards and 500 detectives (a third of whom are women) work in the Goliath central office in Delhi and its 17 branches in other cities. "My experience shows that women get into contact with a person who interests us quicker and in a more natural manner, that they are more diligent and assiduous," Madan says.

Indeed, women detectives are indispensable in the East. "Just imagine the situation," Madan continues. "A woman discovers that she is being shadowed. In India, if it is a man at least a street scandal is inevitable. Everything is settled quietly if it is a woman."



Goliath Detectives investigates not only suspicions of adultery or "trustworthiness" of a potential matrimonial partner, but also murders and kidnappings, industrial and commercial espionage. Incidentally, murders and kidnappings are a prerogative of the police. Private detectives begin to work on a case if the official investigation has reached a deadlock or if the client thinks that the court ruling is wrong. During 30-odd years in private investigation, Ramesh Chandra Madan has rescued from the gallows 26 people sentenced to death for alleged murders. More people have been saved from imprisonment.

The mistakes or miscalculations of policemen uncovered by Goliath do not make the former cherish kind feelings for private detectives. That is why the relations between colleagues in the same field are cautious, if not hostile. "I do not trust policemen and never hire retired policemen," Madan says.

Madan prefers young bachelors with higher education. Later, a Goliath agent can marry and have children. But if a candidate has many brothers and sisters, especially junior ones, the doors of the investigation agency will most likely remain closed to him. "As a rule, such families are under financial pressure," Madan explains, "and hence, most likely, a person comes to us in the hope of improving his material position. This can tempt him to sell secrets he will have in the line of duty."

> In the East private detectives do not trust former policemen

Of 100 to 150 persons wishing to become private detectives, Madan chooses 10 or 15 candidates who will receive a six-month training in a special school at the agency. Its best graduates get a job in Goliath and the rest are taken on by other private agencies of which there are over 100 in India.

Madan is no less exacting towards his clients with whom he talks personally, entrusting this mission to his brother, one of the Goliath managers, only in case of emergency. "The slightest manifestation of insincerity on the part of a client, attempts to conceal information compel me to give up the investigation," Madan says. "I can say no if I feel that I shall be unable to cope with the case. I prefer to lose an advantageous client rather than injure the reputation of the agency."

Goliath has enough clients. As a rule, Madan receives one or two visitors a day. The name of a client is known only to him and his brother. Each of the employees taking part in the investigation is responsible for his rather limited field of work. All reports and information on the case are summed up and put in a file which is kept at the director's personal safe. The director also acquaints the client with the results of the investigation.

Having received a licence, Goliath detectives have the right to carry arms,

mainly handguns. They have eavesdropping and recording devices (long-distance ones too), special camera and video tape recorders, and portable walkies-talkies. The agency has a special laboratory, a make-up workshop and a number of specially equipped cars.

There are no windows in Madan's office room. Three attempts to kill him have been made. Two mercenaries were disarmed before they could push the trigger. Madan was not able to get acquainted with a third mercenary. He shot through the window from a long distance. Luckily, at the time of the shooting Madan bent down to pick up a book. Since then the office rooms of the director have no windows.

Sergei Irodov,
NT correspondent
DELHI



Handling affairs the police won't tackle

Private investigation in Latvia was started by Mark Dubovitsky, who had worked for 25 years in criminal investigation. He retired in the rank of lieutenant-colonel from the post of deputy head of the criminal police department at the republic's ministry of the interior. Earlier, due to his obstinate character, Dubovitsky was transferred from criminal investigation to the anti-vagrancy department. There was no hope of making a professional career there. It was then, however, that the name of Mark Dubovitsky first appeared in the press. Together with his colleagues he set up a vice squad, the first in the Soviet Union.

Mark Dubovitsky's investigation agency, Deadmark, is guided only by the laws effective on the territory of Latvia. The sphere of its competence is limited. Although 32 licences for detective activity have already been issued in Latvia, Mark Dubovitsky thinks that a certain degree of monopoly by the government bodies should be preserved. This concerns first of all the uncovering of criminal offences. Deadmark agrees to handle only those cases which have never been tackled by the police, for instance, the economic security of private firms, small businesses, joint-stock companies and associations.

Promotion of business and protection of family

"There is no civilized business in Latvia today," Dubovitsky says. "Parvenus, those who decided to make a fortune overnight are appearing in the shaping market. It is clear that the methods to which they resort are not always honest. We therefore h our clients to avoid traps."

Mark Dubovitsky invited those w whom he worked in the police for m years and those whom he knew well by th work in the KGB and the Prosecutor's fice.

Of course, not all good specialists of L via work in his agency. But M Dubovitsky believes that it can fulfil order better than the police, because p vate detectives work for money.

Deadmark has a foreign branch, so represented by one employee in Buffa The American colleague provides inform tion about the companies which decided invest their capital in Latvia or set up jo venture enterprises with Latvian firms. the request of American businessn Deadmark collects information about financial status of Latv companies. It will prot the former from falling the bait of numerous fict ous firms now being re tered in the country. sides, Deadmark ensu the security of fore businessmen who visit L via.

One more service is fered by Deadmark – p tection against commercial espiona Though Latvian clients are not yet as spectable as their Western colleagu they also have their commercial secr Deadmark is working out a procedure protecting these secrets from intrud and gives advice on how to keep inform tion.

The proof of adultery or denial of i also on the list of services provided Deadmark. In the West, when a wom and a man get married, they sign a do ment stipulating their property relatio Latvia does not yet have such practi However, Deadmark is prepared to p tect the property rights of spouses. " take orders of this kind with cautio Mark Dubovitsky says. "Exposing ad tery is not necessarily our work. We ha perserved two families and helped peo return to a normal family life." Son times Deadmark gives recommendati to couples who decided to dissolve th marriage. However, in Latvia there are no laws on whether the court can the information supplied by an investi tion agency.

Elena Kovalenk

RI

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Russian woman in focus

Larisa Lisyutkina

The Russian woman will never see Western supermarkets as suppressing freedom

Understanding between the Russian and Western women ends as soon as the women's movement is mentioned.

The Russian woman is convinced that her Western counterpart is involved in the women's movement only because she has no problems to cope with. Meanwhile the Western woman is bewildered why in this country, though the woman has so many problems here, there is no women's movement.

West-detested chivalry adored here

When she says the Western woman has no problems, her Russian sister usually implies the material plenty, comfort and social security she herself lacks.

In her eyes emancipation does not mean sh would like to work. On the contrary, she see this mostly as the right not to work.

The criticism sometimes voiced against West ern consumerism is confronted by a fervent de sire to have commodities in abundance. Indeed for the Russian woman the opportunity to freel choose and consume commodities is an indisput able treasure not hedged by any restrictions.

The Russian woman does not subscribe to he Western counterpart's animosity in respect of th ritualization of relations between the sexes. Sh enthusiastically acclaims such male gestures a guardianship and the stressing of female frailty in short, the entire traditional ritual complex de riving from feudal chivalry.

Though in this country there has never bee any militant mass feminism as in the West, mos Russian women negate the very idea.

In the erstwhile USSR the women's movemen does not have to strive for so common an objec tive in the West as freedom of abortion, as prob ably only here is "socialism" far ahead of West ern democracies.

The current reversal of many women, includ ing college-educated, to traditionalist values ap pears paradoxical only at a cursory glance. Ac tually it is in the mainstream of the conservativ revival implying the upsurge of national sel awareness, the return to religion and th glamourizing of the pre-communist, in effect feudal past. The dethroned working-woma image has been ousted by the ideal feminin charmer.

The granddaughters of the women commissar of old prefer hearth and home, and willingl posture in bikinis in front of TV cameras. A pol of senior Moscow schoolgirls revealed that the regard the prostitute's calling as prestigious Though that might arouse disgust, it is not to b wondered at, as what other response could w expect to forced labour, hypocritical sexual mo ality and poverty, moreover, isolation fro Western and world culture which is thus re garded as forbidden fruit and the ideal for blin copying.

Should one wonder, for example, that Sovie women have no desire to work? Universa employment of women never was the translatio into practice of the right to work. On the cor trary, it was forced labour, allowing the state t exploit the entire population as a cheap work force. For the Soviet person, work is almos completely devoid of meaning and appeal. Th more so for the woman. Despite *pro form*

equality, she continues to be discriminated here. The worst thing though is that the Soviet woman could never freely choose between the right to socially gainful work (actually senseless and by no means gainful) and family and home. The woman, subjected as she was to twofold exploitation, had no right to openly protest against discrimination.

Kitchen resistance

Over the 1960s to the 1980s, home and kitchen were the only domain where the woman was free. In Russia, the kitchen is by no means what it implies in the West. It was the forefront of wholesale resistance to totalitarianism. Today this is remembered with a sentimental nostalgia for which there is good reason, as this was the source for the first time since the revolution of an alternative lifestyle for a rather large proportion of the population.

The woman, who after *perestroika* started openly to call for the right to a place in family and home was not only tired of pointlessly wasting energy on the job, but was also afraid of having children reared by "public organizations" and teachers who, as a rule, like all else, detest their profession like everything else.

The Russian woman does not regard the kitchen, which is rarely more than five square metres in area, as a tiny isolated island. Indeed, the Russian kitchen can accommodate as many people and ideas as any large university auditorium. It serves as the venue for heated debates concerned with cultural and political issues. From the kitchen people went straight to mass rallies with the programmes and leaflets they had devised there. The kitchen is the focus of intimacy, public outpourings and intellectual creativity.

The dismal quality of the social environment that emerged in Russia under the communist dictatorship is most strikingly expressed in the shortage of commodities and services, which thus turns day-to-day life into real torture, robs the woman, forced daily to spend hours on end in queues, of opportunities for personal development and transforms her into an aggressive, downtrodden being.

Thus far the Russian woman does not subscribe to the criticism of consumerism so current in the rich countries. Even the ecologically minded in the former Soviet Union, though opposed to large chemical and nuclear enterprises, and especially the military-industrial complex, never came out against such technological achievements as the automobile or household gadgetry that consume so much water and electricity.

Scarcely will the Russian woman believe Western commodity abundance to be a way of suppressing freedom. Her experience is different. Hence, whenever advocates of a plain lifestyle from the rich countries preach the need for rationally restricting consumerism, they stand forth in the eyes of people in the poor countries as kin to the nomenklatura bosses who, while calling on people to restrain their desires, themselves preferred Western standards of consumerism.

The Russian woman wants to dress well, use cosmetics and drive a car. She will subscribe to the alternative ethics and aesthetics in the rich countries, only when she has made up for everything denied and is as tired of consumerism as the Western woman is.

In the West, due to the traditionally established division between the sexes, where the man earns and the woman spends, the charge of consumerism is not infrequently laid at the woman's door. Though the Western man is chided for being excessively dependent on the automobile, the Western woman is totally taken to task, with her entire lifestyle qualified as pointless, and chores, dress, cosmetics, child care and entertainment presented as unacceptable and wrong. Meanwhile the drive for female emancipation is largely seen as the struggle for equality, implying not so much equal rights as precisely equality with the man.

"Comrade with special qualities"

However, all Soviet history makes this objective and such notions of emancipation unacceptable to the Russian woman. In a certain sense the Soviet Union indeed has sexual equality. In early communist ideology, the woman, as Andrei Platonov put it, was regarded as "a comrade with special qualities." This ideology like national-socialist philosophy oriented the woman on involvement in sports, war games and party meetings. In her appearance, she differed but little from the man, with bobbed hair, trousers, cigarettes and her entire behaviour making of her "one of the lads." This ideal was glamourized in the literature and cinema of socialist realism. As a matter of fact, sexless figures in padded garb will still be spotted on road repair and at building sites, collective farms and vegetable warehouses.

When Soviet women admitted to Western feminists that they adored male patronage and were delighted when hands were kissed, helped on with coats or assisted to alight from cars, their Western sisters booed and hissed. Possibly they were right. Is it really nice to be humiliated in day-to-day life and having a hand kissed only on holidays?

Though the woman in the erstwhile USSR does not entertain any illusions as regards the absurd, hypocritical character of such rituals, she likes them. This derives from Russia's historical hiatus where standards of chivalry were absent. The Russian woman was integrated into social life through the Domostroi, an Orthodox Shariat that is today so intensively propagandized by Russian nationalists. Hence, the yearning of the modern woman of the former Soviet Union for the ritual medieval Western tradition conflicts with conservatism, that finds the erotically tinged decadent chivalry repulsive.

Negation of the remnants of feudal

chivalry by Western feminism may be viewed as modernized society's natural suppression of a superannuated historical tradition that integrated women in social life and ritualized relations between the sexes before laws took over. How can the Russian woman subscribe to the conviction her Western sister espouses, that obsolete chivalry is inappropriate, when she never knew such rituals? On the contrary, the decline of all values and norms the yearning for every form of cultural integration that can somehow override social chaos.

Emancipation from declassé status

In scouting feminism, the woman of the former Soviet Union rejects not only unwomanly conduct and garb, but also one more social conflict between the sexes which, regrettably, has been but little studied as concerns its real nature or its reflection in the mentality of the sexes. Indeed, apart from commonly known divorce statistics, "the colonization of modes of life," implying the discrimination of the woman on the job and in the home, the troglodytic sexual education and the other external expressions of the disharmony in sexual relations, but little is known as to how the two sexes accept and assess this conflict.

On the face of it, the expectations man and woman entertain in respect of one another are at total variance with the actual relationships. The circumstance that life falls so short of expectations tends to generate reciprocated disappointment, vexation and pugnacity. We have here a vicious circle, with a mistaken upbringing falsifying notions of the opposite sex, illusions and mistaken behaviour. Later, when the real relationships inevitably break down, there emerge a reciprocated fury and fear of the future.

If we were to qualify a situation, wherein the woman cannot rely on the man in respect of child care and material well-being, as emancipation and independence, then the Soviet woman is more emancipated than her sisters anywhere else, true, unwillingly so and, it must be admitted, as unwillingly for the man as well. Such is the inevitable spin-off of society's declasse decline.

Hardly will the woman find it appealing and sensible to consciously seek

equality with the man in such a society. Indeed, what is the point in being equal if the man is as humiliated and impoverished?

The problem of the freedom of abortion is a more manifest example of "negative emancipation." In Russia, this freedom has long existed. That borderline, when in the 1950s the Soviet government turned from total prohibition to full freedom of abortion dovetailed with the transition from harsh Stalinist totalitarianism to Khrushchevian authoritarianism. Under Stalin, abortions were forbidden, which signified total ownership by the state of the woman as an individual. Control of her reproductive functions was motivated by state interests, as was the case in Hitler's Germany as well.

One might think that in this respect the Soviet woman indeed has no problems, as total prohibition was followed by total indifference, with the medics generally no longer interfering in the woman's decision. There are no consultations and no social work for pregnant women. As a rule, abortions are done without anaesthetics and in unhygienic conditions. For anaesthetics and decent service, the woman must fork over a bribe. Not infrequently clinics doing abortions place still greater obstacles in the way of women seeking abortion.

From TV reports we learn that in Yaroslavl, legalized abortion is performed only if the husband, relative or friend donates blood. No wonder parallel with the queue of pregnant women at the Yaroslavl clinic from early morning on is another queue of blood donors. In a land where all surgery is fraught with AIDS contamination, such blood donorship is indeed quite a sacrifice.

We are told that one Siberian hospital has made abortions much simpler, by getting women to report at about 5 a.m. and arm themselves with mop and pail, as this hospital has no cleaning women on staff. Hence, the pregnant women seeking abortion are obliged to clean up the place before the respective operations are performed. But as many vomit, cleaning is endless: some mop, others vomit and then those who witness this throw up and so on and on it goes.

One more restriction imposed is the *propiska*, a police-controlled certificate of domicile. As a rule, the woman who lacks this may not apply for an abortion. To circumvent this nonsensical restriction, she either equips herself with a friend's documents or offers a bribe to the medical personnel, with the legally allowed abortion thus performed "on the side." My case history at the neighbourhood polyclinic notes sixteen abortions, which actually have nothing to do with me at all. As I have two case histories, one at the neighbourhood centre, the other at the special polyclinic maintained by one's place of work, I have lent my case history at the neighbourhood polyclinic to out-of-towners who, living in Moscow with their post-graduate husbands, have no *propiska* and may not apply to the local health services.

When the Soviet woman is told that in the West, more specifically, in Germany, abortions are forbidden as killing a living embryo, she either fails to understand or laughs. Only a few religiously-minded women will accept the associated Christian morality. Indeed, in a country where so many lives have been snuffed out by repression and the Gulag, it is well-nigh impossible to understand why a yet unborn life should be protected. The comments heard on this score are the same as with respect to women's movement generally. "She can afford it," they say, "as she has it so good."

Drawing by Maia Berezovskaya (Poland)

A critical view of a successful forum

Prof. *Alexei Kiva*

An international conference on Free Economy and Mass Media was held this February 24-27 in Sochi. The Russo-US forum was dubbed the Aspen Dialogue (after the winter resort in the Rockies, in the State of Colorado, the venue of the September 1991 first meeting of that kind).

This time, the US side was represented by publishers, editors, journalists, mass media scholars, teachers, lawyers, and business entrepreneurs. The Russian counterparts included: Director-General of ITAR-TASS, Vitaly Ignatenko (who was one of the coordinators of the forum), and editors and leading writers from a number of Moscow's periodicals: *Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow News, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, New Times,* and *Stolitsa,* among them.

Russia's business circles were also represented by a delegation headed by Director-General of the International Association of Industrial Managers, Konstantin Zatulin, who was the Sochi forum's coordinator and Co-Chairman, together with Marshall Kaplan, President of the International Centre for Public Administration and Policy, from the USA.

In my opinion, the forum was a success. The US side devoted most of their time to discussing principles ensuring the effective functioning of the free press and the latter's independence from government and business circles. This can be achieved only under constitutional guarantees and economic freedom. Soviet businessmen's complaints against the home press were countered by the Americans, who proved that the freedom of the press and the freedom of the economy are inseparable.

I learned from the ensuing argument that US periodicals which set a high value on public popularity take effort to maintain an independence between the editorial departments and the business (including advertisement) sector. Moreover, teams of reporters, commentators and analysts work independently from each other, to ensure a differentiation between the report of daily events, their brief analysis and commentaries.

However, this is the ideal which is not always attainable. It is realized perhaps only in the most influential and respected publications like the *New York Times,* the *Boston Globe,* or the *Philadelphia Inquirer.* However, with the majority of newspapers, their editors are also their publishers and often even the owners of the newspaper in question.

Noteworthy, US legislation enforces proportional representation of races and of both sexes in television. Is it an example of state interference in the matters of free mass media or legislated nondiscrimination of Afro-Americans and women within the structures of the Fourth Estate? I thought: if this is acceptable in such a politically stable country as the USA, then can Russia and other ex-USSR republics do without a similar "interference" into the organizational matters of the mass media now at a time of internal turmoil and disturbances shattering the former social order and the state system and surging political strife between democracy and reaction?

I had an impression that the Americans present at the conference didn't grasp the current situation in this country in general and in its mass media in particular. Understandably, their Russian counterparts, including editors of newly emerging, mainly business-oriented, publications, profusely spoke about hardships currently suffered by local mass media, in connection with skyrocketing prices for newsprint, for example. Americans were disgusted to learn that Russia's authorities divide the country's periodicals into "desirable" and "undesirable" and treat them accordingly.

I'm far from believing in this discrimination. However, the Americans could have a wrong impression that Russia's authorities are purposefully manipulating the newsprint prices in order to starve the "undesirable" publications to death, put the press under their control, and generally kill the idea of the freedom of the press. But this would be an oversimplified and vastly distorted view of the current situation. Russia's authorities can't even afford to pursue such objectives now when the country is on the verge of plunging into anarchy. They don't have full control, and a lot of things here happen regardless of their will. Neither do I believe that the authorities can help the mass media in a real way, because they don't have means for that either. Furthermore, I'm not sure that they should do it, in light of numerous pro-fascist and openly fascist, including anti-Semitic, and other extremist publications. Nolens volens, they must adopt a discriminating approach to the mass media. The fairness of its actual application is another matter.

Regretfully, quite a few topical issues remained not discussed, partly because of numerous diverting recreational programmes and also because the participants were drained of their polemic energy by a lengthy and spirited discussion of the issue of the "desirables" and "undesirables" in the world of mass media.

But how shall the press in modern Russian conditions (which are vastly different from conditions of the American press) – when the Russian society has embarked on a transition from totalitarianism to democracy – operate? The principle of the independence of the mass media is rooted in the prerequisites emerging in the course of the development of a free-market economy, and is largely guaranteed by the profits from the advertising. Incidentally, the American side paid much attention to the issue of advertising in the press. However, they agree that under a dire shortage of consumer goods and forbidding prices, advertising fails to fulfil its designed function.

Sometimes, the threat to the freedom of the press emanates not only from the powers that be, who try to turn the journalists into servants of the interests of official authorities, but also from uncivilized business, or even from the staff of the publications, who sometimes become oblivious to their publishers, promoters, and, importantly, their duty before society. Representatives of Russia's business circles spoke about corruption among the mass media.

All the themes touched on at the conference are typical for the mass media at a time when it emerges into the Fourth Estate in its own right in any country, not only Russia. However, such problems are already a closed chapter for the contemporary USA.

In this connection, the Aspen Dialogue is a very positive initiative which is going to become a regular feature, in line with an agreement reached at the Sochi conference. All the same, involvement of Europeans and Japanese would be welcome, as well as participation by representatives of newly industrialized nations for whom building of the free press is a current pressing problem, rather than past history. ■

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

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FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

Georgy Fedotov's article "Will Russia exist?", published in the Paris *Vestnik R.S.Kh.D.* (Newsletter of the Russian Student Christian Movement, in Russian, Nos. 1-2, 1929), is perhaps one of the most controversial works by the outstanding Russian thinker. It is no accident that this very article is so often referred to by our "super-patriots" and "organicists" (pochvenniki) who ignore other works by the philosopher whom they do not care much for in general.

The name of Georgy Fedotov is known to our regular readers well enough (see *New Times*, Nos. 23 and 48, 1990). It would be ridiculous to suspect him of "imperialism" or chauvinism. An adherent of Christian socialism, of a democratic social system, Fedotov had always tried to combine two elements – "respect for human dignity" and "the work in the common cause of culture" – in one teaching. The latter element actually gave him the impulse to write the article at a time when he was in a marked spiritual and intellectual crisis, and when Russian emigrants who held democratic views were in a political crisis. His polemic and emotional manner struck notes which were not heard in the thinker's other, particularly later, works. Besides, it should be borne in mind that for Fedotov Russia was "a whole world unto itself." Within that "cultural space," all the processes, in his opinion; could go on in concord only and lead to the formation of a whole, a commonwealth, and the elements constituting the "Eurasian empire" could not exist separately, on their own. In this particular article the emphasis is somewhat shifted to the specific nature of Russia's historical progress. Besides, Fedotov could not possibly predict the pernicious effect of the totalitarian system which held out for six more decades causing strong centrifugal tendencies in the multi-ethnic empire. To be taken into account also is a special aspect of the Russian people's tragedy: the Russian language, Russian culture and a relative numerical prevalence of the Russians were used by the regime as means of strengthening its domination.

Even the mistakes an outstanding person makes are always instructive. The article bears some traces of Fedotov's delusions which, however, give food for reflections. Well, this is a useful occupation not to be ignored...

Will Russia exist?

Georgy Fedotov (1886-1951)

Many do not see the danger, do not believe in it. I can indicate its symptoms. The most alarming and mystically significant of them is the oblivion of the name Russia... Among Russian emigrants who are supposed to keep the memory of Russia there appear trends and groups which erase its name and refer to it as "a union of the peoples of Eastern Europe," or "Eurasia," not as Russia. What do these facts imply? They go to show that Russia is becoming a geographic and ethnographic space, meaningless and empty, which can be filled with any state system. Some are internationalists to whom Russian national traditions mean nothing; others are ex-patriots who renounce the very gist of this tradition – the opposition to Islam, to Genghis Khan – so as to create an entirely new, fictitious country of their dreams. In either case, Russia is seen as a national desert, a suitable place in which to experiment with social utopias.

One may dismiss these symptoms as merely new intellectual kinks which, besides, have not found their way into Russia. There is no denying, however, the danger of separatisms tearing the body of Russia apart. Over eleven years of the revolution, dozens of ethnic secessionist movements have emerged, developed and gained momentum in its enfeebled body. Some of them have already become a formidable force. Under the cover of international communism there takes shape, in the midst of the Communist Party itself, a cadre of nationalists seeking to smash Russia's historic body to pieces... The Kazan Tatars have nowhere to go, of course. They can only dream of Kazan as the capital of Eurasia. On the other hand, the Ukraine and Georgia (as represented by their intelligentsia) are craving for independence. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are gravitating towards the Asian centres of Islam.

We learn, to our horror, that Siberians, pure-blooded Siberian Russians, also bear a grudge against Russia and dream of the Siberian Republic, an easy prey to Japan. We have somehow forgotten all about the fact that the greatest empire of Europe and Asia has been built by a national minority which has imposed its culture and its will upon an entire ethnographic continent. We are saying with a well-justified pride that Russia's hegemony was for all its nations (except the Western ones) a blessing because it gave them a chance to gain access to world culture through the medium of Russian culture. However, the growing children we have adopted seek to leave the school which has fostered them; some look to the West, others to the East, and still others prefer an international geometrical space, i.e., spiritual nonexistence.

Amazingly, the Russian alone does not show any signs of life in the noisy chorus of voices. He complains about everything – hunger, rightlessness, ignorance, but the only thing he cannot wake up to is the danger which threatens his national being...

National thought has become the monopoly of the government-backed right-wing parties ... Russian nationalism manifested itself chiefly in the senseless baiting of small ethnic groups, in infringing upon their legitimate spiritual requirements, thus making ever newer enemies for Russia... Here is just one fact, the basic one, of the many aspects of the Russian revolution: when

the World War was in its third year, the Russian people exhausted its strength and patience and refused to defend Russia... It did not only ceased to understand the aims of the war (which had hardly ever been clear to it); it no longer had any need for Russia, let alone Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus. Anyone may get hold of them and share them. It is no business of ours. Such is a result of the age-long erosion of national awareness. In Moscow Rus, people possessed national awareness, no doubt, as evidenced, for instance, by their songs of those times. The Russian people knew its land and its enemies. Its historical destinies merged with its religious mission were clear and understandable for it. In Peter the Great's empire, the people no longer understood anything. Its very geographical limits defied people's imagination...

Serfdom, which erected a wall between the people and the state and which replaced national duty by bondage to the slave-owner, completed the disintegration of political consciousness. The peasant revolts which broke out as early as during the Patriotic War of 1812 were a stern warning. The religious idea of a God-anointed Tsar holding supreme power could rouse the people to great sacrifices, to miracles of passive heroism. However, the meaning of those sacrifices to the state was more than they could understand. The fall of the tsarist idea resulted in the fall of the Russian idea. The Russian people disintegrated, scattered into a myriad of tiny village worlds which any alien power, masterful and ruthless, could put together into any state which suited it best.

Added to the action of those destructive forces was the delayed action of a certain historical phenomenon which was independent of people's will and which all but escaped our notice. I mean the exodus of forces, both material and spiritual, from the centre of Russia proper to the outskirts of the Empire. Over the 19th century, Novorossia, (Southern lands conquered from Turkey and now part of Russian Federation, Ukraine and Moldavia – **Ed.**) the Caucasus and Siberia grew ever richer and ever more populous as a steady flow of new settlers came pouring in. At the same time, the peasants of Central Russia spiritual degradation and steadily going to rack and ruin which ultimately resulted in what the economists called "the impoverishment of the centre." Russia proper was falling into decay being drained of its blood by the provinces which now complain about it having exploited them. The most alarming thing was that the economic process was accompanied by ebbing of spiritual forces from the old centres of Russian life...

...It will take us a strenous effort – I'd even say, heroic effort – to save Russia.

Russia is neither Austria nor old Turkey where a small nation predominated over an alien majority. Being a cultural "layer cake" of smaller ethnic groups, Russia is not a national monolith like France or Germany, but then the Russian nation has a much stronger ethnic basis than Austrian Germans do; second, the Russian nation, far from being culturally inferior to the nations subordinated to it (as is the case in Turkey), is the only one within the limits of our state to possess a great culture. The other cultures which are now living through a period of chauvinistic frenzy, are of a provincial nature for the most part, objectively speaking, and owe a great deal to Russian culture. Third, old Russia's nationalities policy, oppressive to its cultured Western provinces which have now broken away from it (Finland, Poland) was, in general, fair and beneficial to the East. The East readily put up with the rule of the White Tsar who neither suppressed its traditions, nor insulted its religion, and who offered it a worthy place in the roomy Russian home. Fourth, most of the nations inhabiting Russia like islets in the Russian sea cannot exist separately from it; others will, if they secede, be inevitably swallowed up by neighbours. In the Caucasus, where scores of tribes live in an explosive atmosphere of mutual enmity, it is only the fair superarbiter who can prevent this enmity from erupting into a bloody war which will inevitably destroy any sprouts of new life for local ethic groups. The Ukraine will have to choose between Poland and Russia, and whether it opts for the old common home will largely depend on us. And fifth, the old economic links which make the former empire and the present USSR a single economic organism are still working for us. It can fall apart, of course, like Austria has, but disintegration will be painful to all the members of the economic community. The forces of economic inertia are favourable to Russia.

Whether we take advantage of the chances we still have depends on us, i.e., primarily on the new generations rising over there in Soviet Russia and, to a smaller extent, here, in exile.

> In our age, national ambitions sometimes mean more than national interests, that call for ties with other peoples

I shall not dwell here on the indisputable political prerequisites for Russian renascence. One of such prerequisites is the creation of national power in Russia. I shall only note, in parenthesis, that even if it sets Russia's national forces free, the fall of communist dictatorship will be of great danger. It will certainly let loose the separatist tendencies, now suppressed, in certain ethnic groups of Russia which will try to take advantage of the revolution to break away from Russia...

I shall concentrate here only on the spiritual aspect of our work, i.e., on the intelligentsia's mission. This mission is, in a nutshell, to awaken and foster national awareness in ourselves.

In our epoch, culture no longer reproduces and enriches itself spontaneously. The "natural" sources of culture have almost run dry. The Russian people have entered a period of rationalism, they believe in the book, in the printed word, they cultivate (or warp) their mind in school, in the atmosphere of artificial culture. Hence the enormous and ever growing influence of the intelligentsia – even of a low order, of journalism even; hence the emergence of new, "artificial," nations created by the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia creates those nations "from memory," so to speak, by collecting and animating long-dead historical reminiscences and reviving ethnographic relics. On the one hand, the school and the newspapers are the media of a standardized, corrupting, cosmopolitan culture; on the other, they can serve, and are serving already, as means of promoting creative national culture. We ought to emerge from our complacency and to follow the example of small ethnic groups and their intelligentsia enthusiastically creating national traditions out of nothing, or almost nothing. Our own tradition is rich and glorious, but is has tarnished in the eyes of the present generation...

We must revere and learn to distinguish in hagiographic icons the faces of Russian saints who bring us their behests and their national understanding of eternal Christianity. We must revere the heroes, the builders of our nation, its princes, tsars and citizens, we must study the chronicles of their struggle, their efforts, we must learn from their mistakes, and we must draw inspiration from their heroic endeavours without, however, trying to slavishly imitate them. We must know Russia, its nature, the life of its peoples, their art, their religions and their customs. We must know all about Russia proper, above all...

The need for reviving, resuscitating Russia is obvious. Any look into the history of Russia, any pilgrimage in its tracks, leads us to the heart of Russia, to its north where the great monasteries, with their fantastic murals – "divinity in colour" – still stand, lost in the woods, where old beliefs and even ancient sagas are still alive: the old towns (Uglich, Vologda), and ancient monasteries (Kirillov, Ferapontov) should be made national museums and art centres

pen to excursionists from all over Russia. The study of our sacred ntiquity, which is carried on in Bolshevik Russia, must continue ith unabating intensity, and enthusiasm with which it is done is ertain to infect all the peoples of Russia. The Russian North ould become a Mecca for pilgrims from all corners of the world – ke ancient Greece or medieval Italy – rather than for Russians nly. For us Russian Christians this land of miracles is sacred: it eeps the memories of zealots like St. Sergius who sought refuge in ie quiet of the woods and prayed there for the salvation of much-ffering Rus. The Russian North, however, is not only a museum nd a holy cemetery... It has a great economic potential...

The Moscow industrial region (which includes Yaroslavl and Kostroma) stood the test of the revolution. In that land "Holy Rus," the priceless relics of our past, exist cheek by jowl with modern factories, and workers' settlements – with the abodes of St. Sergius' disciples; these contrasts may not appeal to the eye but, at the same time, they symbolize the need for the Russian Orthodox Church to impart spirituality to modern technological progress...

Let us now proceed from Russia proper to Russia at large. As far as the Ukraine is concerned, the most important problem now is not only to keep the Ukraine in the body of Russia, but also to make Ukrainian culture part of Russian culture. We are now witnessing a turbulent process of great danger to us: the emergence of new Ukrainian national self-consciousness, of a new nation, as a matter of fact. It is still in its formative period, and its fate is not predetermined yet. Efforts can be made so that its self-consciousness would assert itself as a specific form of Russian self-awareness. The southern Russian tribe once laid the groundwork for Russian statehood and for our national culture, and had always called itself Russians (till the end of the 19th century). Its fate will largely depend on whether we Russians identify with the Ukrainians or alienate them. In the latter case we shall inevitably lose them... While working for the good of Russia proper, we must also show consideration for the Ukraine, our original Motherland, and recognize the specific features of its historical and cultural progress. In opposing political separatism, in upholding the Russian idea and the Russian cause in the Ukraine, we should not mix the Russian cause with that of Russia proper and trample upon the sprouts of Ukrainian (which is also Russian) culture... We speak different languages, we cherish different memories... But we also have something in common: the holy relics of Kiev and the monasteries of Holy Rus...

We have gone all the way from Rus to Russia. Russia is not Rus but a union of the peoples who have rallied around Rus. These peoples are no longer dumb, they are speaking up in a discordant chorus, trying to shout one another down. Many of us still cannot put up with that. If we fail to reconcile ourselves with this – I mean polyphony, not discordance – we shall remain confined to Russia proper, i.e., greater Russia will cease to exist. We must show the world, after the collapse of so many empires – that the tasks an empire, i.e., a supranational state, sets itself are feasible. What's more, when the world, tired of the bloody chaos of intertribal strife, starts seeking unity as a prerequisite for a great culture, Russia is to give a model of peaceful international cooperation under the leadership, not under the domination, of a great nation. Politicians are to find flexible but firm forms of this connection which guarantees every nation freedom of development to the extent of its maturity and ability. Every Russian cultural worker's mission is to rise above his self-awareness as an ethnic Russian (while remaining a good Russian, of course) and become aware of himself as a citizen of Russia at large. This means that he should represent the greatest spiritual values of all the nations of Russia. I mean eternal, ecumenical values. Any ethnic group can contribute, in its own small way, in word and deed, to Russian glory, to the cause of Russia. In our age, national ambitions sometimes mean more than national interests. Far from feeling humbled by Russians as such, each small ethnic group, i.e., its intelligentsia, should feel assured of the Russians' help and cooperation in promoting its national cultural cause... Many of us seek to oppose the economic interests of the masses to the "artificial" national claims of the intelligentsia. Sooner or later, all people will become intellectuals, and neglect of their spiritual requirements will have to be paid a dear price for. Spiritual requirements have to be distinguished from political claims: the titles of Moscow tsars and Russian emperors were followed by a long list of peoples subject to their power. The fact that Russia comprised a multitude of tribes added to rather than detracted from its glory... Russia is not a nation, it is a world. If it fails to accomplish its supranational continental mission it will perish as Russia.

> The fall of communist dictatorship, setting free national separatist interests, will be of great danger to any statehood, even national

The peoples of Russia cannot be united by force of the religious idea alone. Beliefs set us apart instead of uniting us. Russian culture has been and remains a force of spiritual attraction for the peoples. Russian culture affords them an access to world civilization. This is how it was in the Petersburg period of the Empire, and this is how it should be now. If the peoples of Russia receive their education in Paris and Berlin rather than in Moscow and Petersburg, they will not stay with us. The Russian intelligentsia should exert every effort to keep its cultural heights, and to attain ever newer ones tirelessly, without respite, not only for its own sake, in order to quench its cultural thirst or to serve its professional interests, but to promote the national cause of Russia...

We are to overcome two of our weaknesses which still render futile the Christian intellectuals' attempts at creativity. First of all, we must relinquish the habitual involvement of Russian Orthodox Church in political, cultural and everyday life. Russian Orthodox Church should be regarded not as a conservative force, but as a source of freedom to sort out old treasures, to create a new life. The second weakness, opposite to the first one, in a sense, is religious individualism. For someone who has retired into his own spiritual shell, problems of national culture, and of culture in general for that matter, just do not exist. As the first school of spiritual life, this seclusion of the soul may be legitimate and necessary. As a tradition, as a lifestyle of a whole generation, it is a deformity which leads to national passiveness...

My answer to the question put in the heading is not a simple and reassuring "It will," but "It depends on us!"



Juris Bojars, a member of the Latvian parliament and leader of the Democratic Party of Labour, became famous some time ago thanks largely to his tough stand during the time when the draft law on citizenship was discussed in the country. Many believe that as a result of his efforts the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia are destined to be second-class citizens. Bojars asserts, however, that the law adopted by the parliament measures up to the standards of international law. Several years ago he was awarded his doctor's degree for a dissertation on this subject at the foreign ministry's diplomatic academy.

Bojars is now drawing up a second variant of the law on citizenship. Under the new law non-citizens will have the right to take part in local elections, and their right of private ownership is to be retained.

Juris Bojars is one of the most paradoxical of Latvian politicians. He is not ashamed to talk about his service in the KGB's counterintelligence as a junior officer. Twenty years ago he took part in an operation to unmask large-scale hard currency deals. Bojars does not conceal that for many years he was a member of the Communist Party. However, he never regarded himself as an orthodox Communist. Bojars admits that he "thought in a social democratic way" and was inclined towards the Swedish model of socialism, which he studied at Uppsala University.

Bojars does not like to take part in meetings, though he is reputed to be a good speaker. "I can exploit emotions but consider it improper to drive the audience in a frenzy. I try to appeal to its intellect," he says.

* * *

The first exhibition of drawings of **Garif Basyrov** has been organized in the Central Artists' House in Moscow. Basyrov finished the Moscow art school and studied in the all-Union state institute of cinematography. But he did not go to work in cinema. Garif did not like the atmosphere of film studios with their numerous bosses. He earned his living by book and magazine designing. He made series of drawings which then turned into a silent film.

Basyrov came to the *New Times* office to show his drawings in the summer of 1990. His series "Inhabited Landscapes" determined, till this day, the design of the magazine.

One of the art criticis defined the gist of Garif's drawing in this way: "Just as Velasquez found his heroes in the luxury of brocade and velvet, so Basyrov has found his heroes among concrete slabs and in the industrial no-man's land of dreary-looking Soviet outskirts."

* * *

Nelson Wang, the owner of a high-class restaurant, China Garden, situated in a fashionable district of Bombay, is known to Indian businessmen. He takes pride in having served prime ministers, members of parliament and film stars. The two weeks before his death, Rajiv Gandhi ate breakfast in this restaurant.

The life of Wang is a classic example of how a poor man can climb his way up. Born in Calcutta, he began his career in the local Spencer Hotel. Having mastered the art of Chinese cuisine, he moved to Bombay, considered "a city of great opportunities," found a job in one of the restaurants, and before long signed a contract for the delivery of Chinese dishes to the city's numerous clubs.

In 1981 Non Chak, the owner of the China Town restaurant, highly appraised Nelson's culinary skills and offered him half of the profit in the restaurant business.

Many customers, delighted with his "exquisite dishes," suggested that Nelson open his own restaurant and promised financial assistance to him. Having received a credit at the Bombay Mercantile Cooperative Bank Ltd., Wang founded a restaurant, China Garden, which was opened with a ceremony on April 15, 1984.

The "godfather" will appear before a court

John Gotti, 51, head of the most powerful US mafiosi clan, Gambino, is to appear before court in New York. He is charged with five murders, blackmail, an illegal gambling business, and other unlawful deeds.

Preparations for a sensational trial are in full swing. The selection of a jury has been started. It will have to deliver a verdict of guilty or not guilty. Twelve "main" and six "reserve" members of a jury are to be chosen from among 500 candidates. Their names will naturally be kept secret. To avoid threats or bribe attempts, the jury will spend the three months before the trial strictly isolated in a New York hotel. The judge will apparently forbid them to watch television and even speak with their relatives over the telephone.

Many believe, however, that even these precautions may not be sufficient. They recall that Jean Gotti, brother of the present "godfather" of the American mafia, was also brought up for trial five years ago. But he bribed private detectives, and they disclosed the name of one of the jurors. Jean Gotti promised a luxurious sport car to this juror in exchange for "a favourable decision."

As befits a real mafioso, John Gotti has Italian roots. A son of a Naples worker, the fifth child in a family of 13 children, Gotti moved up in the mafia hierarchy, shying away from nothing in his climb to the top. He removed his predecessor, Paul Castellano, from the post as head of the "family." Hired gunmen fired at Castellano point-blank when he was going out of a restaurant.

Formally, John Gotti headed a large company for the delivery of waterpipes and radiators. It was used mainly for "laundering" the money earned by dishonest methods. Gotti was also engaged in charity. In one of the poor districts of New York a hospital for the poor was built with the money of the Gambino "family."

It took the FBI and police much labour to gather sufficient evidence for the arrest of John Gotti. Luckily, one of his close aids agreed to testify against him. For a year now Gotti has been kept under investigation in a Brooklyn prison. If the jury brings a verdict of guilty, the "godfather" will probably never be a free man again.

Nelson used his own form of advertising. A month before the inauguration he invited the most influential people to have a taste of the new restaurant's dishes. It was worth the expense. ...

Nelson himself makes dressings and sauces.

* * *

One of the Ukrainian newspapers recently published a letter from Mikhail Shvaika, deputy chairman of the parliament's commission for economic reform, giving "a principled assessment" of the conduct of **Alexander Savchenko,** 33, deputy chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine.

Savchenko went to Canada to settle questions connected with the printing of the Ukrainian national currency. If one is to believe Shvaika, Savchenko arbitrarily changed the composition of the group by striking him (Shvaika) from the list and including some "Miss M." who has nothing to do with the introduction of the national currency and the contract with the Canadian Bank Note Co Ltd.

According to Shvaika, who "suffered from Savchenko's irresponsibility, the latter failed to settle any business matter and only enjoyed himself, travelling from Ottawa to Toronto.

Finally, a member of parliament flew to Canada and settled a number of questions which this "demagogue and gas-bag" was unable to decide. Shvaika added some more details to Savchenko's portrait: "He seldom comes to work, gives lectures in foreign institutes, and runs about various departments, bamboozling the simpletons."

It transpired after all the scandals and revelations, that the Canadian Bank Note Co Ltd. with which the Ukrainian government had concluded an agreement on the printing of the republic's monetary unit did not even have paper and dyes. Moreover, it did not have enough capacity to print the required amount of banknotes.

Canada is said to be trying to turn the printing order over to Third World countries. In his letter, Shvaika mentions Mexico where, he believes, "labour is cheap".

* * *

French film actress **Beatrice Dalle** admits that she hates taking part in erotic films. "I feel shy to appear in my bathing-suit on the beach even with my friends," she says. The participation in Beneix's film 37x2 was a real ordeal for Dalle. In accordance with the script, she had to take off her clothes several times in front of the camera. After that, Beatrice said, she wept for hours in the evening.

Judging by her recent films, the "French Francesca Dellera," as cinema critics call her, has indeed decided to change her image radically. In the latest film of Jim Jarmusch, Beatrice plays the part of a blind girl. The hearts of people are breaking when they see her groping her way with a stick. In the next film of Claude Lelouch Dalle agreed to play the part of Maria Magdalene, intimating that there will be no hint of sex in it.

Sharp-tongued people note, however, it will not be easy for Beatrice to make the public believe in her transformation from "a sinner into a woman of virtue," the more so that the new image of the actress is belied by her somewhat shady past. Last November, for instance, Dalle was detained by the police when she was leaving a jeweller's shop in Paris. Jewels worth about 5,000 dollars were found in the tops of her elegant boots. It is said that such things happened in Dalle's life before.

A former prisoner wants to be a banker

Vasile Viscu has been released after serving a seven-year term in the camps. His trial in 1985 on charges of bribery was regarded as a sign of *perestroika,* for in the dock was the deputy premier of Moldavia.

Today the former Deputy Premier and former First Secretary of the republic's Young Communist League describes the regime as totalitarian, criminal by its birth, and condemns its use of Stalin methods of repression. Vasile Viscu, who worked for many years in the ideological field, considers himself a victim of the just overthrown cruel regime, "this permanently hungry dragon." He contends that he was convicted on political grounds. It turns out that the real cause of his persecution was his illegal address to the Moldavian people drawn up by him for distribution in the form of a leaflet. It began with the words: "Moldavians, patriots of our people!"

"The people should know," Viscu says, "that some members of the former Communist government of Moldavia risked their lives by fighting for the ideas of present-day freedom. This must soothe the rivalry between those who seek the title of the fathers of national revival.

Viscu alleges that he was forced to admit bribery and that his trial was a political farce. Even the ex-President of the Union did not want to do anything" for his release, he adds.

A former inmate of the Urals camp of the "Stalinist type," he worked first as a fitter there. However, Viscu says, it was exhausting work, and he never managed to fulfil his output norm. Then he was employed in a design office at the economic service of the camp's secondary school. After his release Viscu again wants to work for the welfare of his country. "My interests are in the national economy, banking and trade," he says.

A bodyguard

I met this man in the Crimea just after a fight over a lady's dignity had concluded. Sergei confessed to me that he was not keen on fighting, but had to fight from time to time in line of duty. His job was protecting prostitutes, of the variety who only accepted foreign currency for their services

We follow his inside story about a world we know next to nothing about

Vitaly Mukhin

After a tour of duty in the military police, I found my way to a hand-to-hand combat federation which had set up a private agency for the protection of individuals and property. I didn't stay for too long there though, got kicked out for having accepted a bribe for turning a blind eye to thefts of "hardware" from the warehouse I was supposed to guard.

I was unlucky, one might say, because it is common practice for guards to help themselves to what they are supposed to protect – spare parts, for instance, which are always in short supply and which we sold at a profit. We all did that, I repeat, because subsistence wages were paid us only onc month, and all our bosses were out-and- swindlers despite being ex-cops. They ca nothing for the labour code and felt free lay off anyone they didn't like the looks I heard they've been beaten black and b recently. This can best be done durin sparring match, kind of legally, you know

I went around jobless for a couple months and finally landed a job in a d clinic. At first, everything went well. worked in shifts, making the rounds of clinic in twos and calming down alcoholi Then we had trouble with the head phy cian because we had "seduced" all nurses and lady doctors, his wife includ So when they offered me a guard's job at t Moscow Intourist Hotel, I readily accepte

We caught "interlopers" in the morning

The hotel, patronized by the heads "Chechen," "Georgian" and other mafi and guarded by militia and by beefy gu from a private protection agency, was a re ular clip joint. All of us took bribes: just enter the bar or the restaurant, a guest h to shell out 50 and 25 rubles, respectively cost a foreigner 20 dollars, and a Soviet, 1 rubles, to take a girl to his room. This "bri rate" was handed down to us by our pr decessors.

We made money in different ways: s vodka and cigarettes at night, rented roo to wealthy clients in a supposedly "book up" hotel, allowed cabmen the use of t hotel's parking lot. So long as we mind our own business there was no friction wi the mafia. We even made friends with t mafia which kept front offices at the ho for money laundering. But after we start demanding money from their guards for l ting them bring girls into the hotel, our rel tions became strained a bit. Later, ho ever, we found common ground, and th even helped us with weapons after we h quarrelled with the Chechens over foreign-currency prostitute harassed by Chechen thief. She asked her pimp – militiaman who was a member of our ganization – for protection. Presently rei forcements arrived on both sides. A lo talk ensued, but there was no shooting.

Actually, admission to the hard-curren bar is free. Whether you get paid by a clie or not depends on how smart you are. T militia had brought its own girls alon planted them in the bar, and charged th 20 bucks per visit to a client's room. La we planted our own girls there, and al made them pay. Each guard has girls of h



Foreign-currency prostitutes caught in Moscow's Kosmos Hotel

own and lays no claims to others. Settlements are made in the evening, as a rule. They pay up honestly. As for "interlopers," we caught them in the morning, took them to our office for a check of identity, and searched them there. We explained to those girls that they were supposed to pay us. If a girl tried to be tricky, she got beaten up and her earnings taken away from her, after which we even offered her business cooperation, or recommended her not to show herself in this place again.

That was how I met one of my future girls. Having penetrated into the hotel, she tried to slip out without paying the following morning. We demanded explanations, and she said that she was an honest girl and spent the night with a friend. So we took her to a secluded place and undressed her. We found a hundred dollars, wrapped up in a cellophane bag and hidden in – you know where.

With another girl, it was simpler. She came up to me one morning and asked to exchange her hard currency for Soviet money – it was her birthday. Then we cabbed it to the Razguliai restaurant, had lunch there, and made friends.

"My" girl and her friend are not really high-class prostitutes: they charge their clients 100-150 bucks a night. There have been bigger "catches," though. Once I heard a girl charging an American 500 dollars for her services and stopping at that only because she realized that was the limit.

Girls take to prostitution for various reasons. Some regard this as a means of providing for their future. Such girls do not drink, as a rule, and take their work very seriously. Others simply enjoy life. They think nothing of spending 300 greenbucks in a bar a night. There was a drug addict who was on the needle most of the time. For some reason she "worked" with Russians only, although she had the looks that might have won her foreign clients. She appeared on the scene with a girlfriend. Then the latter was taken away by two Georgians, and no one ever saw her again. She left her things behind in her hotel room.

I supply the drug addict with "medicine" which I bought for her from someone I knew. We always had it ready for her to keep her in good shape. She was quite a looker and earned good money, but wasn't of much use when "hung over." Therefore we always had something to give her a "pick up." She charged her clients 500 dollars for a "session," and over.

For all the honesty, however, the girls kept trying to steal their way into the hotel without paying us. Two "dolls" told me they paid the militia, and lied to the militia that they paid me. They managed to work free for two weeks that way. Then they were found out, and had to give all of their next two weeks' earnings to us. We took hard currency and rubles away from them, leaving them only their cab fares. Besides, we kept "pepping them up" physically.

The rumours about the Japanese are greatly exaggerated

Now I don't work at the Intourist Hotel any longer – they fired me "over soccer." Remember that USSR-Italy match? I got 20 bucks apiece, and didn't share the money with anyone. The takes added up to some three hundred dollars. The militia took offence and decided to square accounts with me. 'When I just looked into the foreign-currency bar on the following day, they reported to my superiors that I had gotten drunk the night before, thrown dollar bills around, and called them names... So I got the axe.

That left me without a job. I had to make a living somehow. Luckily, I had made friends with two girls and we decided to rent an apartment and to work together. We go to bars, the girls pick up clients, and I see to it that they don't get robbed or beaten up (such things do happen) and that clients don't cheat them. I get my 20 percent for that. Besides this, the girls pay 100 dollars a month to the driver.

One of the girls and I are in love. She supports me financially. She doesn't tell me she patronizes the bars, thinks I may object to that. When she comes home from a bar, she says they give her money "for nothing." Well, I know how it all happens, although some clients do make gifts of money.

I know that even if they decided to give up their occupation, the girls would not be able to do that because they've got accustomed to high living, fancy clothes and delicious food. Can a normal Soviet woman afford all this, especially these days?

I am not afraid of AIDS because the girls insist on their clients using condoms, and avoid even deep kissing, let alone other things. If paid well enough, they cater to their clients' special tastes, however.

The risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease is low, because my girls deal with Europeans only – Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, all of them are much in the way of housewives. They sleep till 3 p.m., and spend the nights working.

Now she keeps telling me about marriage, but she does not realize that if she marries, she will have to forget all about her line of work. In that case I shall have no use for her. She has not a penny to her name, and it would be difficult for me to maintain the lifestyle she is used to. Those who save up enough to provide for themselves and for their families may, perhaps, marry and settle down to a quiet family life. My girl is not suited for such a life at all. A few days ago, they were kicked out of the Irish House. They had gotten roaring drunk there and solicited a Frenchman. The bar tender told them never to come back again.

Photo from NBI and Stern (Germany)

Hollywood goes to Moscow

Gangster mania in Hollywood is good news for Moscow. At least one director, currently shooting a 10-part series of films tracing the history of American gangsters, has set up shop in Moscow, where costs are bare-bones and parts of the run-down city look just like Chicago in the 1930s

Renfrey Clarke

America of the 1930s

1992. Moscow. The Sretenka is vintage-1930s Chicago

Chances are that the next Hollywood gangster film you see may have Russians playing the extras and dingy streetscapes that are a real-life stretch of central Moscow.

Hollywood director Menahem Golan – whose early films catapulted Sylvester Stallone and Chuck Norris to stardom – is currently using Moscow as the setting for a series of movies tracing the history of American gangsters. Since September, Golan's firm, Twenty-First Century Film Corporation, has been shooting the story of "Mad Dog" Coll and is well on his way into the next film in the series, *Hit the Dutchman!* Ultimately there may be as many as 10 such films, all shot overwhelmingly in Moscow.

Why would an American company make movies in Russia? The main reasons, Golan says, are financial: working with the Russian firm, Start Productions, Twenty-First Century can meet most of its production costs in heavily devalued rubles.

But Moscow offers other advantages. There are few settings in Chicago these days that remotely recall the 1930s. But change a few signs in Central Moscow, and streets like the Sretenka or Solyanka become vintage-1930s Chicago.

Then, too, producers can find European-looking extras who are already accomplished actors and actresses who need little coaching to perform non-speaking roles. And Moscow, unlike various Third World locations, possesses an extensive local film industry: sound stages can be hired, along with experienced local crews. The technical equipment that 21st Century has had to bring with it is limited to cameras, film stock and some lighting grips.

A Siberian-born actress, a veteran of numerous demanding roles, waits in satin shorts and jewelled shoes for her non-speaking part as a cafe dancer on the set of *Hit the Dutchman!*

A Russian lighting technician applauds the pay he receives but is shocked by "the gruelling work pace." With local productions he works a 40-hour week. With the Americans, he's on the set six days a week, 13 hours a day.

The American cast comprise mostly young, relatively unknown people. "I've never been so cold!" says Californian Abigail Lenz. But she's also never seen a film crew who could work miracles with equipment that looks like leftovers from the 1940s.

After his 10-part gangsters series, Golan plans to make a love story, entitled *Forever Natasha!*, dealing with problems that beset a young Russian woman involved with an American man. He also hopes to make a four-part mini-series in the spirit of *Crime and Punishment*, featuring a modern Raskolnikov – an impoverished student struggling to survive amid the "shadow economy."

Films such as these will provide a range of speaking roles for Russian actors and actresses, the director says. Can Golan see himself launching a Russian Sylvester Stallone or Chuck Norris onto the world movie scene?

Pacific News Service
Photos by K. Isakov and from the book America's Heritage

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